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WHEN THE HISTORY OF THE SPACE WAR COMES TO
BE WRITTEN THE PART PLAYED BY THE COMMUNICA-
TIONS MANAGERS IN THE U.S. CONTROL CENTRES
WILL BE SEEN TO HAVE MADE A REMARKABLE AND
DECISIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THE ALLIED WAR
EFFORT.
The Third World War
INTRODUCTION
IT'S THE FIRST space war," said a space policy analyst,
lreferring to the Persian Gulf conflict.' Senior U.S. De-
partment of Defense (DoD) officials were expected to2 and
did have a firsthand view of the fighting at the front, cour-
tesy of INMARSAT 3 communications satellites. The Gulf
War heralded the beginning of yet another great era of the
space age.4 Electronic still video photos taken by troops
were transmitted, almost instantaneously, via portable satel-
lite ground terminals to the Pentagon via the INMARSAT
system.5 The rest of the world was able to observe the crisis
on television via broadcast transmissions over the INTEL-
SAT6 satellite system, which was "the primary pipeline for
U.S. news broadcasts out of the Persian Gulf region ....
The United States DoD leased at least one of the six Ku-
band transponders on the INTELSAT 5 satellite located
over the Atlantic Ocean for its Gulf War communications
needs.8
John Pike, Federation of American Scientists, quoted in Vincent Kiernan, War
Tests Satellites' Prowess, Military Space Systems Put to Work During Desert Storm Conflict,
SPACE NEws, Jan. 21, 1991.
2 Vincent Kiernan & Renee Saunders, Satellites Relay War Front Imagery to Pentagon
Officials, SPACE NEws, Jan. 21, 1991, at 17.
3 International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT).
4 Walter D. Reed & Robert W. Norris, Militay Use of the Space Shuttle, 13 AKRON L.
REv. 665 (1979) (citing Remarks of President Carter at the Congressional Space
Medals Awards Ceremony, 14 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 1686 (Oct. 1, 1978),
wherein, referring to the U.S. Space Shuttle, he said, "The first great era of the space
age is over . . .").
5 Kiernan & Sanders, supra note 2, at 17.
6 International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT).
7 DanielJ. Marcus, News Events from 'Desert Storm' Seen Via JNTELSATLinks, SPACE
NEws, Jan. 21, 1991, at 17.
8 Id. INTELSAT 5 was repositioned to meet the demand.
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The Gulf Conflict was not only an early illustration of the
"new world order," but it also vividly illustrated the signifi-
cant and pivotal role played by military and civilian satellite
communications systems in international crises. Just as Jo-
hann Gutenberg's invention of forms for movable type
ushered in the Renaissance, the microprocessor, used in
satellite communications, has brought about a new renais-
sance in communication.9 The Gulf Conflict marked an im-
portant turning point for Defense Ministries of major space
powers. Finding less funding for military satellite pro-
grams, inadequacies in area coverage by military satellites,
inadequate military satellite capacity, and more advanced
commercial satellite applications, the Ministries are turning
more and more toward satisfying their needs by obtaining
commercial satellite service.
The purpose of this article is to explore the extent to
which the U.S. military may use commercial satellite com-
munications systems without violating international law.
Although a number of global and regional systems will be
mentioned, the primary focus of the article will be INMAR-
SAT because of the unique limitations found in its Conven-
tion.10 This article also addresses limitations on provision
of service to the military found in INTELSAT's Agreement11
as well as legal principles applicable to commercial commu-
nication satellite service providers in general.
International legal scholars disagree as to whether or not
all military use of satellites is lawful under international law
applicable to outer space. Some go so far as suggesting that
certain nonmilitary uses of commercial satellites may be un-
lawful as well. At least one author has suggested that the
9 John H. Petersen, Info Wars, Naval Institute Proceedings, NAVAL REVIEW 88 (May
1993).
10 Article 3(3) of the INMARSAT Convention states, "[T]he Organization shall act
exclusively for peaceful purposes." Convention on the International Maritime Satel-
lite Organization, INMARSAT Basic Documents, 4th ed. (1989) [hereinafter INMAR-
SAT Convention].
11 Articles 111(d) and (e) of the INTELSAT Convention proscribe the provision of
"special services" to the military by the Organization. International Telecommunica-
tions Satellite Organization Agreement, Feb. 12, 1973, 23 U.S.T. 3813 [hereinafter
INTELSAT Agreement].
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lawfulness of military use of communications satellites is not
open to question. The debate, which has not been resolved
and may never be, primarily revolves around whether or
not military use of satellites violates the 1967 Outer Space
Treaty provisions dealing with the use of outer space or ce-
lestial bodies for "peaceful purposes."1 2 The concept of us-
ing common areas for peaceful purposes and the "peaceful
purposes" language itself is found in many treaties, conven-
tions and United Nations resolutions related to the earth
and outer space. Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty states:
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit
around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or
any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such
weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in
outer space in any other manner.
The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all
States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful pur-
poses. The establishment of military bases, installations and
fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the
conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be
forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific re-
search or for any other peaceful purpose shall not be pro-
hibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for
peaceful exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies
shall also not be prohibited.'"
Although not much has been written on the subject in the
past dozen years, the great debate over the interpretation of
the Outer Space Treaty's words "peaceful purposes" has
yielded numerous definitions, ranging from the idea that
any military use of satellites is "nonpeaceful" to the notion
that only "aggressive" use of satellites is nonpeaceful and
therefore impermissible. The thesis of this Article is that
neither of those interpretations reflect the true state of in-
ternational law applicable to outer space today. The con-
cept and applicability of the "peaceful purposes"
32 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967,
18 U.S.T. 2410 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
1- Id. at art. IV.
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proscription is much more fluid or malleable than those
definitions would suggest. This interpretation is equally ap-
plicable to the "peaceful purposes" clause of Article 3(3) of
the INMARSAT Convention.1 4
Scholars have also argued for years over the extent of the
applicability of the "peaceful purposes" language; does it
apply just to the moon and celestial bodies or to outer
space as well? I believe that, as of 1994, the matter of the
scope of the applicability of the concept has been settled.
Support for the conclusion that current international law
requires all of outer space to be used for "peaceful pur-
poses" is compelling.
Finally, the obligations that nations have assumed, under
the Charter of the United Nations, play a pivotal role in
setting the parameters of the peaceful uses of outer space
and in validating some military uses which might not other-
wise be considered "peaceful."
This Article is divided into five parts:
Part I discusses defense policies, military communications
satellite usage (in general and during illustrative regional
conflicts), present military (communication) satellite pro-
grams, communications services offered by commercial and
regional satellite organizations (focusing on INTELSAT
and INMARSAT) and the DoD's shift toward obtaining
commercial satellite communications services. The empha-
sis is on U.S. programs since they are the most widely publi-
cized and open.
Part II examines INMARSAT's history and structure in
depth, including an analysis of the INMARSAT Convention
with particular reference to its travaux preparatoires. INTEL-
SAT's Convention and structure is discussed as well as the
relationship of the U.S. Communications Satellite Organi-
zation (COMSAT) 15 to both INTELSAT and INMARSAT.
The views of those organizations concerning military usage
14 Article 3(3) of the INMARSAT Convention states, "[T]he Organization shall act
exclusively for peaceful purposes." INMARSAT Convention.
15 COMSAT was created by the U.S. Congress by the Communications Satellite
Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-624, 76 Stat. 419 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 701 (1988)).
242
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of their systems is set forth. Finally, the U.S. State Depart-
ment's and the U.S. Military's view of INTELSAT & INMAR-
SAT usage is described.
Part III addresses the applicability of pertinent provisions
of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty with some discussion of
other applicable international legal regimes, including vari-
ous space treaties and United Nation's resolutions. The fo-
cus is on Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty. Part III deals
with the definition of use of space for "peaceful purposes"
and the issues of whether the requirement of use of space
for "peaceful purposes" applies to "outer space" and if so,
who is responsible for outer space activities.
Part IV deals with the concept of "peace." What is
"peace?" What is the meaning of the language "peaceful
purposes" found in the Outer Space Treaty, and what is the
extent of its applicability? Part IV discusses permissible uses
of outer space under the United Nations Charter, such as
for self-defense and peace-keeping. Part IV concludes with a
review of the impact of Customary International Law on the
issue of the use of outer space for "peaceful purposes."
Part V sets forth an assessment of the various interpreta-
tions given the terms "use of space for peaceful purposes."
It discusses the application of the concept. Is there a need
to change the INMARSAT or INTELSAT Conventions? Are
those Conventions and the Outer Space Treaty being vio-
lated? Part V concludes with a summary regarding the defi-
nition and application of the requirement of using space
for "peaceful purposes."
PART I. MILITARY SATELLITE USAGE
"The militarization of space has become an accomplished
fact ... "16
16 Ivan A. Vasic, The Legal Aspects of Peaceful and Nonpeaceful Uses of Outer Space, in
PEACEFUL AND NoN-PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE, PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION FOR THE PRE-
VENTION OF AN ARMS RACE 45 (BhupendraJasani ed., 1991).
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A. MILITARY SATELLITE USAGE BY ILLUSTRATIVE COUNTRIES
"Outer space has achieved the dubious distinction of be-
ing the most heavily militarized environment accessible to
humans. ''"7 "[W] ithout satellites, performance of many mili-
tary missions would become impossible, and performance
of others would require large increase[s] in the unit
strengths of various U.S. force elements."1 8  In July 1989,
the former Chief of the Soviet General Staff, declared that
"Soviet military space activities will help to enhance by up to
100 percent the combat efficiency of the Soviet armed
forces." 19
1. Defense Policies
It is particularly apropos to discuss military satellite usage
in light of recently announced rearticulations of both
United States and Russian strategic military doctrine. The
new, more assertive, Russian doctrine rejects the Soviet
Union's earlier position that it would never use nuclear
weapons in a first strike and sanctions the use of its troops
beyond Russia's borders to protect "national interests." 0
The emerging U.S. post-Cold War doctrine is one of "en-
largement" which seeks to increase the number of demo-
cratically-elected governments world wide and supports
U.S. unilateral, decisive, military intervention when other
nations directly threaten U.S. citizens, U.S. forces, or U.S.
vital interests.21 Former U.S. Secretary of Defense, Les As-
7 Id. This statement is based on the number of military and civilian payloads
launched into orbit.
18 Id. at 51. (citing U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, Anti-Satel-
lite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control (Wash. D.C., U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, 1985); National Security Policy of the United States, DEP'T ST. BULL., Apr.
1988, at 18).
19 Isabelle Sourbes & Yves Boyer, Technical Aspects of Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses
of Space, in PEACEFUL AND NoN-PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE, PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION FOR
THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE 59 n.3 (BhupendraJasani ed., 1991).
20 Fred Hiatt, Russia Shifts Doctrine on Military Use, New Principles Permit Troops to
Intervene at Home and Abroad, THE WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 1993, at Al. The 23-page
classified document was adopted by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his Security
Council, on Nov. 1, 1993.
21 Neil Munro, Congress, White House Differ Over Security Plan, DEF. NEWS, Sept. 27,
1993, at 1. The article quotes the comments of U.S. National Security Advisor, Ar-
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pin, called the new policy a "shift from a defensive strategy
to a much more positive strategy of encouraging American
values." 22 The new U.S. posture calls for forces, twelve air-
craft carriers, ten Army divisions, and twenty air wings,
which should be sufficient to fight two major wars simulta-
neously.23 National Security Advisor Anthony Lake added,
however, that the U.S. prefers to operate in cooperation
with other states or the United Nations. 4
In a study conducted for the U.S. Army, Rand concluded
that the Army's roles and missions were likely to increas-
ingly involve the rapid deployment of small, U.S.-based,
units to unpredictable environments. These missions will
require the use of satellite communications because of the
often lacking communications infrastructures and the need
to operate independently.25
Similarly, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) is re-evaluating its military doctrine. In September
1993, NATO parliamentarians from Canada, Germany,
Denmark and other countries recommended, in a radical
shift in policy, that NATO unilaterally undertake
"peacekeeping" operations when the United Nations or the
Conference on Security and Cooperation In Europe
(CSCE) fails to act.26 NATO officials believe that Article 51
of the United Nations Charter27 allows a group of nations
or a single nation to come to the aid of another UN mem-
thur Lake, at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Stud-
ies, on Sept. 21, 1993, and a speech by Secretary of State Warren Christopher at
Columbia University, Sept. 20, 1993. The strategy, formally adopted in the Penta-
gon's Defense Planning Guidance and Presidential Review Decision 13, was an-
nounced to the United Nations in a speech by President Clinton, on Sept. 27, 1993.
2 Id. at 37.
25 Id.
24 Id. at 1.
25 Deborah R. Castleman & Susan M. Everingham, U.S. Army Communications Us-
ing Commercial Satellites, A Rand Note Prepared for the US Army, No. N-3386-A [here-
inafter Rand Study].
26 Theresa Hitchens, DEF. NEws, Sept. 6-12, 1993, at 3 & 5 (referring to the
"America and Europe: The Future of NATO and the TransAtlantic Relationship"
report).
27 U.N. Charter, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.I.A.S. No. 993, 3 Bevins 1153 (ef-
fective Oct. 24, 1945). Art. 51 establishes the right of "self-defense" which will be
discussed extensively in Part III, infra.
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ber nation, even absent a UN Security Council mandate. 28
More specifically, NATO strategists foresee missions calling
for highly mobile reaction forces rapidly deployable into
any potential conflict with mobile systems blending com-
mercial and military space-based communications.2 1 "Satel-
lite communications will continue to play the major role on
connectivity with crisis areas."3 0 According to NATO offi-
cials, deficiencies in its information systems capabilities
would be cause for a veto over proposed military actions.3 1
2. Country-by-Country Usage
As of 1989, at least fifty countries used satellites they
owned for some or all of their telecommunications and
broadcasting needs.32 In addition to the U.S. and Russia, a
number of countries and regional organizations, such as
NATO, utilize both military and commercial satellites for
military purposes. The French, for example, use France's
TELECOM satellites, which have a military communications
payload, to communicate with their overseas territories.3 3
The Japanese Self-Defense Forces are the primary users of
INMARSAT satellite services and ground stations purchased
by Kokusai Denshin Denwa (KDD) . Iraq utilized INTEL-
SAT services.3 5 Spain's Centro Superior de Informacion de
-8 RKA, Communications Systems Form Core of Alliance Identity, NATO's Militavy Capa-
bilities Increasingly Will Be Defined By Its Information Resources Infrastructure, SIGNAL, Oc-
tober 1993, at 51.
- Id.
- Id. at 52.
m' Id. at 51.
32 DAVID W.E. REES, SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS, THE FIRST QUARTER CENTURY OF
SERVICE 267 (1989).
-- French Satellite System: TELECOM-1, NORTH-HOLLAND SPACE COMM. & BROAD-
CASTING 6 (1988) at 159-162. The satellite's 7/8 GHz payload, designed communica-
tions between naval ships, shore stations and national military authorities, is part of
their Syracuse (System of Radio-Communications Using a Satellite) system. DONALD
H. MARTIN, COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES 1958-1992 214 (1991). Recommended
Role for Commercial SATCOM Systems in an Integrated MILSATCOM Architec-
ture, Defense Communications Agency, OSD Review Draft, July 15, 1991, at 6-1
[hereinafter DCA Draft].
Japanese Troops to Use INMARSAT, SPACE NEWS, Aug. 30, 1992, at 2.
3 Kathleen Killette, Iraq Net Critica COMM. WEEK, Jan. 21, 1991, at 60. Iraq used
two INTELSAT satellites and owned an earth station prior to the Gulf Conflict. In
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la Defensa (CESID) set aside approximately $200 million in
1988 to procure the use of commercial satellite services,
such as INTELSAT, ARABSAT and EUTELSAT, as well as to
participate in the French Helios military satellite pro-
gram. 6 Spain's Hispasat satellite system's military mission
includes a global coverage antenna and will support its land
and naval forces in Europe, North Africa, and adjacent
ocean areas.3 7  The United Kingdom has its military
SKYNET-IV satellite system.3 8 NATO utilizes its NATO se-
ries of satellites for military communications.39
France and Russia have registered the following satellites
as using the C-band in geosynchronous orbit (GSO) for
"government" purposes: France's TELECOM series and
Russia's Raguda series, Prognoz series, and Gorizont se-
ries.40 The term "government use" is not further defined.
Other governments and organizations have registered such
GSO satellites using the C-band under functional catego-
ries, such as maritime, meteorological, tracking, weather,
experimental, broadcasting, diplomatic, regional coverage,
and international fixed service. 41 It is thus difficult to ascer-
tain from the registries whether the satellites so registered
are being used for military purposes.
The following countries and organizations all have com-
munications satellites in orbit: U.S. (military satellites,
TDRSS, Marisat and US domestic satellites), Russia (mili-
1988, Iraq's communications purchases were expected to reach $550 million by the
year 2000, according to the article.
Spain Improving Military Communications, Irr'L DEF. REV., Feb. 1, 1988, at 110.
37 Martin, supra note 33, at 237-238.
- The British SKYNET military communications satellites were first launched in
1969-70. They have some degree of interoperability with U.S. systems. Martin, supra
note 33, at 102-03. The UK is presently using the SKYNET IV series which covers an
area from Turkey, the North African Mediterranean coast, Norway, most of Western
Europe and reaches the U.S. East Coast. It provides the capability to communicate
with submarines and land mobile units and aircraft. Id. at 116.
39 Id. at 99-100, 105. The first NATO IV-A was successfully launched in Jan. 1991.
Id. at 118. Another NATO IV satellite is scheduled to be launched in late 1993-early
1994. These satellites are identical and have the same capabilities as the British
SKYNET 4 satellites. Id. at 118.
-o Walter L. Morgan, C-Band Geosynchronous Satellite Locations (as of May 5, 1993),
SATELLITE COMM., Oct. 1993.
41 Id.
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tary, government, and other satellites), Canada (Anik,
Satcom series, and MSAT), Argentina (Nahuel II), Indone-
sia (Palapa series), U.K., France, Italy (Italsat), Japan (N-
Star series, Sakura series), India (Insat series), China (PRC
and DFH series), Cuba (STSC-1), Brazil (Brazilsat series),42
Mexico (Solidaridad series), Australia, Spain (Hispasat),
Malaysia (Measat), Seychelles (Seysat), Malta (Melitsat),
Tonga (Tongasat), Finland (Finasat), New Guinea (Pacstar
series), EUTELSAT, ASETA (Association of Telecommuni-
cations State Enterprises of the Sub-Regional Andean
Agreement comprised of Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru,
and Venezuela) (Simon Bolivar series), Arabsat, Asiasat
(Asiasat series), COMSAT (Comstar series), INTELSAT,
and INMARSAT.43 Once again, it is difficult to ascertain
which of these satellite systems may have military
applications.
3. United States Military Satellites
Military use of outer space is fundamental to U.S. na-
tional security. 44 Numerous space systems, such as those for
navigation, weather forecasting, communications, mapping,
geodetic measurement, nuclear explosion detection and
monitoring, ballistic missile early warning, photo reconnais-
sance and surveillance, are considered "force multipliers"
which support and enhance military operations.45
Military communications satellite usage generally falls
into three categories: (1) command and control of strategic
forces; (2) secure voice and wideband, high capacity com-
munications supporting the intelligence community, major
headquarters, and the National Command Authority; and,
42 The Brazilian military has two channels on Brazilsat-1 and will obtain another
on Brazilsat-3. It decided to obtain a satellite system after neither Brazil, Argentina,
nor Uruguay could intercept British satellite traffic during the Falklands/Malvinas
conflict in 1982. SeeJANE'S MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS 304 (13th ed. 1992).
43 Morgan, supra note 40; Martin, supra note 33, at x.
44 Reed & Norris, supra note 4, at 666.
45 Id.
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(3) beyond-the-horizon communications between mobile
forces and their command structure.46
The U.S. has, among others, the following military com-
munication satellite systems:47
DSCS II and III. The primary users of the constellation
of 21 Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS)
satellites are the Worldwide Military Command and Control
System, ground mobile forces, Navy ships, the White House,
and the DoD's AUTODIN (dedicated data transmission
network) and DSN (DoD's dedicated voice network). A
majority of DSCS terminals are small, transportable or ship-
board models.
MILSTAR. The MILSTAR system provides high capacity
secret communications service for strategic and mobile mil-
itary forces through a constellation of seven survivable,
hardened, satellites.48
FLTSATCOM. FLTSATCOM serves primarily the global
tactical needs of Navy surface ships, submarines, aircraft,
and shore stations. The Air Force shares these satellites with
the Navy and uses their capability (AFSATCOM) for strate-
gic aircraft, airborne command posts, and ground termi-
nals. (The Marisat satellite system, developed by COMSAT,
provided service to the Navy before the introduction of
FLTSATCOM. It also provided service for commercial ship-
pers. The last one was launched in 1976 and had a five-year
life expectancy).
TACSAT. Tacsat was designed to operate with small mo-
bile, shipboard, or airborne terminals. It was used exten-
sively by the military and is no longer in operation.49
IDCSP. The Initial and Advanced Defense Communica-
tion Satellite Program (IDCS and ADCSP) were older sys-
- Id. at 666-67.
47 Martin, supra note 33, at x.
48 Martin, supra note 33, at x. Neil P. Munro, Polar Satellites May Face Delays, AIR
FORCE TIMES, Nov. 8, 1993. Legislation was introduced in the U.S. Congress in April
1994 to terminate Milstar. The first Milstar satellite was launced in February 1994; a
second is scheduled for launch in 1995. Jim Garamone, Milstar is Key to Tactical
Communications, INTERCOME MAG., July 1994, at 7.
49 Martin, supra note 33, at 98.
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tems used extensively for high speed data relay and should
no longer be in operation. 0
UFO. The eight Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Follow-On
(UFO) system will provide replacements for FLTSATCOM
and Leasat services.
LEASAT. The Leasat system supplements FLTSATCOM.
Leasat serves both the Navy, ground mobile forces and the
US Air Force.
NAVSTAR. The Navstar series is designed for precision
global positioning service (GPS) and navigation. The
twenty-third Navstar satellite was successfully placed in orbit
in late 1993;5 1 the system became fully operational at that
time.52 Navstar may also be used by civilians.5" This Global
Positioning System network will be a constellation of twenty-
four satellites operated by the US Air Force, about 12,000
miles above the Earth, that sends location information to
ships, aircraft and vehicles. 54 The U.S. Air Force is testing
technology (Project Talon Zebra) which will incorporate
Navstar GPS data into intelligence networks, F-117 aircraft
and guided weapons. The Air Force expects that by the
year 2000 all Air Force F-16 fighter aircraft will be outfitted
with GPS receivers to enable them to track their positions
within a few meters.55
FEWS. Recently, the DoD announced plans to scrap the
Follow-on Early Warning (FEWS) System which replaced
the Defense Support Program (DSP) satellite series. DSP
satellites same missile launch detection function DoD is
scrapping the FEWS because of funding shortfalls and ap-
o Martin, supra note 33, at 96.
51 Military Newswire Service, Oct. 27, 1993.
52 Lisa Burgess & Neil Munro, GPS: Navigating the Future, New Uses for GPS Challenge
Pentagon, DEF. NEws, Nov. 29, 1993, at 8 & 10. The GPS satellites emit two types of
positioning signals: one, a coded highly accurate one for U.S. military use; and, a
less accurate one for commercial use.
53 Military Newswire Service, Oct. 27, 1993.
54 Lisa Burgess & Neil Munro, Pentagon Fears Loss of GPS Control DEF. NEWS, Aug.
2, 1993, at 8.
5 Neil Munro, USAFEyes NewData Link for F-117, DEF. NEWS, Sept. 27, 1993, at 24.
250
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pears to have chosen to go with a low-cost system for launch
in the year 2006.56
POLAR ADJUNCT. This multi-military service series was
designed to supplement MILSTAR with the ability to pro-
vide secret communications to ships, aircraft, and subma-
rines near the North Pole, where such service is sparse.
This service appears on its way toward cancellation due to
budgetary cutbacks. 7
4. Former Soviet Union's Military Satellites
The former Soviet Union has identified several of its sat-
ellite systems5" which may or may not be used for military
purposes:
Molniya 1, 2, 3. The Molniya (Lightning) series of com-
munications satellites were used for domestic and interna-
tional telephone and television communications by the
military and government.5 9  The over 100 Molniyas
launched between 1965 and 1985 were used primarily for
military communications.6"
The Statsionar series (Raguda, Ekran, Gorizont). The
Statsionar T series was designed to broadcast television to
the northern and Asian regions of the USSR.61 The Stat-
sionar system, however, has global coverage and the capac-
ity to provide telephony and telegraphy. 62 The announced
purpose of the Gorizont was television relay.63
Luch. The Luch is intended for domestic and interna-
tional commercial communications. It is probably used for
both government and military purposes.64
56 Neil Munro & Steve Watkins, US Eyes New Network for Satellites, AIR FORCE TIMES,
Nov. 15, 1993, at 40.
57 Neil P. Munro, Polar Satellites May Face Delays, AIR FORCE TIMES, Nov. 8, 1993, at
32.
5 Id.
5 Martin, supra note 33, at 125.
60 Jim Bussert, Soviet Navy Communications, JANE'S SOVIET INTELLIGENCE REVIEW,
Mar. 1, 1990, at 137.
61 Martin, supra note 33, at 127.
62 Id. at 126.
6 Id. at 127.
- Id.
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Gals. Gals (Tack) is intended for government and mili-
tary use.65
Volna. Volna (Wave) is a system for mobile communica-
tions used exclusively by the Soviet Union.66
Raguda. Raguda (Rainbow) is presumed to be a GSO
military/government communications satellite similar to
the Statsionar series.67
Morya. Morya (Seaman) is a system for maritime satellite
communications.68
Glonass. Glonass is Russia's global positioning satellite
with functions similar to the U.S. NAVSTAR system. Like
NAVSTAR, it is a weapons guidance system controlled by
the military.69
B. COMMERCIAL COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE SERVICES
1. INTELSAT Services
INTELSAT, an international treaty organization with
over 125 member countries,70 provides global telecommu-
nications services of every type through its global satellite
capabilities. Member countries are the "Parties." Each
member country designates its "Signatory," or representa-
tive, before the organization. Some countries have desig-
nated their Postal, Telephone and Telegraph organizations
(PTTs); the U.S. has legislation appointing COMSAT as its
Signatory. Non-member countries may utilize INTELSAT
services as well. 71 Historically, the Signatories were INTEL-
SAT's customers; however, as of March 1993, INTELSAT
Signatories could permit INTELSAT to deal directly with




0 Ian Verchere, To Russia on GLONASS, Doc. 8883, Data Base AT7, CA ed., Aug. 2,
1993, at 1.
70 In addition to the major space powers, its members include Argentina, Croatia,
Haiti, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Panama, Somalia, and Yugoslavia. See 1992 INTEL-
SAT ANN. REP. COMSAT's 1992 Annual Report states INTELSAT has 125 members.
7, REES, supra note 32, at 31.
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non-signatory entities.72 All INTELSAT users are charged
the same rate for similar service.
INTELSAT was the first commercial supplier of satellite
communications services, beginning service in 1965.74 His-
torically, INTELSAT provided service to and from fixed lo-
cations. INTELSAT provides four basic services: public
switched network services from which it derives over 50% of
its yearly revenue; private network services (about 8% of
revenues); broadcasting services (12.5% of its revenue);
and domestic/regional services (about 7.5% of its reve-
nue). 5 INTELSAT satellites have two functions. First, the
primary satellite in each ocean region provides basic con-
nectivity to all nations in the region; the primary is supple-
mented by a spare used for preemptible services. Secondly,
other satellites provide specialized services, such as bun-
dling major path communications so as to alleviate traffic
on the primary satellite, business communications to small
antennas, cable restoration, and domestic leased services.76
INTELSAT officials say "the long-term reliability of satellite
communications has never been better, with a 99.99% con-
tinuous service rate.""
In addition to video teleconferencing (VTC), and car-
riage of broadcast television, the INTELSAT International
Business Service (IBS) and INTELNET services should in-
terest most prospective military users. IBS carries VTC,
high and low-speed data, facsimile, packet switching, non-
public switched telephony, and electronic mail, at speeds
ranging from 64 Kbps to 8.448 Mbps. 8 INTELNET is a data
72 1992 INTELSAT ANN. REP. 14. It is unlikely COMSAT, the U.S. Signatory would
have either the authority or inclination to permit direct dealings between INTEL-
SAT and other US entities. The approval of the Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC) would be required in any case. As of the writing of this Article this
subject has not been opened on the FCC docket.
13 REr.S, supra note 32, at 33.
74 Id. at 29.
7- 1992 INTELSAT ANN. REP. 6-9.
- Martin, supra note 33, at 77.
77 Arthur Hill & Steve Shaw, INTELSAT Faces 21st Century, INtrERvIA SPACE MAR-
KEr-s, Nov. 1, 1989, at 274.
78 REES, supra note 32, at 53.
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broadcast and collection service from small earth stations
introduced in 1984.79
INTELSAT successfully deployed the INTELSAT 603 and
INTELSAT K satellites in 1992. It has an additional ten
satellites on order and has an agreement with Russia to use
three of the latter's INFORMKOSMOS8 ° for additional
leased capacity.a1 It has over 300 authorized customers glob-
ally, more of which are non-Signatory customers than Sig-
natory customers.82 INTELSAT serves over 180 countries,
territories and dependencies with its fleet of twenty satel-
lites and has connectivity to more than 2700 earth station-
to-earth station satellite communication links.83 INTELSAT
is considering procuring and operating new K-band space-
craft as well as evaluating Landmass satellites not presently
offered by INTELSAT to augment existing capability.8 4
In October 1993, INTELSAT successfully launched the
first of its INTELSAT VII 85(No. 701) satellite series and
plans the next launch in March 1994.6 The INTELSAT VII
will provide new and additional capacity for the Asia-Pacific
region. 87 It has the capacity for 18,000 two-way voice cir-
cuits (90,000 with full use of digital circuit multiplication
techniques) and three television transmissions. 8 The more
powerful INTELSAT VII will permit use of smaller earth sta-
tions than the 5-30 meter antennae previously required. 89
7 Id. at 54-55.
80 INFORMKOSMOS was created by the Russian Federation to "design, control,
manufacture, own and finance the Express Satellite series." 1992 INTELSAT ANN.
REP. 7.
81 1992 INTELSAT ANN. RP. 70.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 1992 INTELSAT ANN. REP. 16.
85 Unlike its predecessors, INTELSAT VIls will have "steerable" G-band spot
beams which are capable of being redirected. Ku-band beams are all steerable. G-
band coverage is generally the broadest, e.g., global or hemispheric coverage. Ku-
band coverage is limited to spot beams. DCA Draft, supra note 33, at 2-60. This is
significant in that spot beams are traditionally utilized for mobile services, such as
those provided by INMARSAT.
86 1992 INTELSAT ANN. REP. 15.
87 Id.
-o Martin, supra note 33, at 78.
88 RErs, supra note 32, at 49.
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The single INTELSAT K satellite began service in the At-
lantic Ocean region (AOR) in 1992, providing Ku-Band ser-
vice which, among other capabilities, allows direct-to-home
satellite broadcasting, voice and data transmission and vide-
oconferencing9 ° over the ocean and between Europe and
Latin America.91 INTELSAT-K has the capacity to handle
65,000 voice circuits (using digital circuit multiplication) or
32 TV transmissions. 92
The fifteen INTELSAT VI satellites have a capacity of car-
rying approximately 24,000 two-way voice circuits (more
with digitization) plus three TV transmissions.93 There
were eight INTELSAT V satellites in operation at the end of
1990, each with capacity for 12,000 two-way voice circuits
plus two television transmissions. 94 In the late 1970's, IN-
TELSAT added a maritime communications subsystem to
some of the INTELSAT V satellites which provide ship to
shore and shore to ship communications. 95 At the end of
1991, INTELSAT had five INTELSAT V-A satellites in
operation.96
The INTELSAT satellites previously in operation, the IN-
TELSAT-I (Early Bird), II, III, IV, IV-A are no longer opera-
tional.97 Each successive INTELSAT satellite series has had
to develop new techniques to take advantage of the addi-
tional capacity the latest technology offers. For example,
Early Bird had the capacity for only 60-124 circuits per day
compared to INTELSAT VII's 90,000.98
o Martin, supra note 33, at 74.
1992 INTELSAT ANN. REP. 10.
Martin, supra note 33, at 74.
93 Id. at 67.
- Id. at 57, 60.
95 Id.
- Martin, supra note 33, at 74.
97 Id. at 47-56.
98 Rees, supra note 32, at 35.
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2. INMARSAT Services
Like INTELSAT, INMARSAT is a 72-nation 99 interna-
tional organization that provides global satellite telecom-
munications services, primarily to the maritime community,
through the "Signatories" designated by its "Parties."
Although maritime services is its biggest revenue source (to-
taling 78% in 1991), INMARSAT now offers both land mo-
bile100 and aeronautical services. 10'
INMARSAT operates through a system of forty-two Land
Earth Stations that includes thirty-two Coastal Earth Sta-
tions (maritime services) and ten Ground Earth Stations
(aeronautical services), coupled with a fleet of seventeen
satellites providing nearly complete global coverage. IN-
MARSAT's four operating regions include the Pacific
Ocean Region (POR), the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), the
Atlantic Ocean Region (AOR), and the Atlantic Ocean Re-
gion-West (AOR-W). 102 Most of its remaining first genera-
tion satellites were shifted to spare or standby status in
1991.103 By January 1992, INMARSAT had placed all four
of its INMARSAT-2 satellites into operation." 4
- In addition to the major space powers, its membership includes Argentina, Pan-
ama, Iran, Iraq, and Yugoslavia. See INMARSAT Annual Report (1991). The Wash-
ington Post reported that INMARSAT had 72 members as of Oct. 18, 1993. Sandra
Sugawara, Battle in the Skies: Comstat and Motorola Joust over Wireless Phone Market,
WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1993, at Fl. The membership was up to 75 members by Au-
gust, 1994. INMARSAT Message (August 1994).
-0 1991 INMARSAT ANN REP. Land mobile services generated about 21.9% of
INMARSAT's 1991 revenues. Aeronautical services accounted for 0.1%.
10, Id. According to its Annual Report, INMARSAT had total revenues of $261.3
million in 1991, a 44% increase over 1990. In 1991, INMARSAT exceeded its Signa-
tory-return on capital requirement.
102 1991 INMARSAT ANN REP.
, Id. A MARISAT satellite which had been a "backup" was used in 1991 to pro-
vide temporary service over the Pacific Ocean Region (POR).
104 1991 INMARSAT ANN REP.
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INMARSAT SERVICES
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105 Id. at 5.
'06 INMARSAT provides data rates of less than or equal to 64 Kbps and voice rates
up to 9.6 Kbps. DCA Draft, supra note 33, at 2-7.
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INMARSAT plans to begin launching its four INMAR-
SAT-3 series in 1994/1995.107 The INMARSAT-3 will have a
global beam and five spot beams and will support smaller,
less costly, mobile-satellite terminals which will permit di-
rect mobile-to-mobile communications via the satellites.10 8
More significantly, the INMARSAT-3's will have the naviga-
tion payload needed to develop an international civil com-
plement to the U.S. GPS and Russian GLONASS navigation
systems." 9 INMARSAT sees INMARSAT-3 as the vehicle for
transition from the national GPS and GLONASS systems to
an international system. 10
By the end of 1991, over 100 commercial and corporate
aircraft were using INMARSAT's Aeronautical services, and
107 1991 INMARSAT ANN REP.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 24.
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over 12,875 INMARSAT A Ship Earth Stations had been
commissioned."' Three consortia of INMARSAT Signato-
ries were providing world-wide voice and data communica-
tions by the end of 1991.112 The International Agreement
on the Use of INMARSAT Ship Earth Stations in the Terri-
torial Seas and Ports was signed by thirty-four member
countries and entered into force on December 12, 1993. It
permits continuous mobile satellite services by ships in na-
tional waters."13
According to INMARSAT, "a major benefit of satellite
communications is in automatic dependent surveillance
(ADS) for continuously monitoring aircraft positions ...
reducing aircraft separation in oceanic airspace and permit-
ting greater route flexibility." ' 4 INMARSAT is working with
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to de-
velop a future communications, navigation and surveillance
concept relying on satellite communications." 5
INMARSAT says land mobile communications is its fastest
growing market with over 4,339 land-based INMARSAT-A
and INMARSAT-C portable terminals deployed as of the
end of 1991.116 Amendments to INMARSAT's Convention
and Operating Agreement to permit it to provide land mo-
bile services had been approved by twenty-six Parties and
Signatories as of August, 1994."17 INMARSAT-A terminals
are 30-35 Kg, can be packed in suitcases, are usable any-
11, Id. COMSAT reported more than a dozen airlines (and 120 aircraft) were us-
ing INMARSAT Aeronautical services in 1993. THE MOBILE SATELLITE COMMUNICA-
TIONS REVOLUTION, COMSAT MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS 12 (1993).
112 1991 INMARSAT ANN REP. The three consortia are: Skyphone (UK, Norway,
Singapore); Satellite Aircom (Canada, France, Australia, & USA-based IDB-Aero-
Nautical & the Societe' Internationale des Telecommunications Aeronautiques
(SITA); and GLOBALink (U.S. and Japan).
113 INMARSAT Message (August 1994).
114 1991 INMARSAT ANN. REP. 19.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 21. There were 2,539 INMARSAT-C terminals commissioned by Dec.
1991, with 953 for use on land and 1,586 at sea. COMSAT reports that INMARSAT
"serves more than 20,000 mobile terminals on the land, sea, and in the air."
Brochure, COMSAT Aeronautical Services, Global Coverage. As of August 1994, IN-
MARSAT reported the following total commissions: INMARSAT-A 23, 702; IMNAR-
SAT-B 60; INMARSAT-C 12, 133; INMARSAT-M 2043.
117 INMARSAT Message (August 1994).
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where, and provide voice, data, facsimile, and telex ser-
vice."1 They are particularly useful in remote areas not
served by a telecommunications infrastructure. INMAR-
SAT-C enables travellers to communicate world-wide by
portable computer.' INMARSAT-C, when integrated with
a GPS receiver, has the capability of providing both posi-
tioning and communications.
3. Regional Commercial Satellite Services
In addition to INTELSAT, INMARSAT, and NATO, there
are a number of regional satellite communications organi-
zations, including EUTELSAT, INTERSPUTNIK, ASIASAT,
ASETA, RASCOM and ARABSAT.' 2° Three are described
briefly:
EUTELSAT (The European Telecommunications Satel-
lite Organization) is the largest global, international tele-
communications satellite system after INTELSAT and
INMARSAT. 121 Like INTELSAT and INMARSAT it is gov-
erned by two international agreements.122
INTERSPUTNIK originated in 1974 and had sixteen
members, primarily the former Eastern-Bloc nations and
nations aligned with them.123 It provided television, teleph-
ony, and telegraphy service. In addition to including some
of the satellites listed above, INTERSPUTNIK planned on
launching a new series of eight TOR satellites in the 1990's
to provide global service comparable to that of INTELSAT
and INMARSAT. 124
ASIASAT is owned by China, a Hong Kong trading con-
glomerate, and a large telecommunications company.
ASIASAT's one satellite was launched in 1990 by China and
was expected to operate for ten years. It is used for domes-
,is 1991 INMARSAT ANN. RP. 21.
119 Id. at 22.
12 Morgan, supra note 40.
121 FEES, supra note 32, at 63.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 55. Non-Eastern Bloc users included Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Israel, U.S. and
Syria.
124 Id. at 57.
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tic communications by Thailand, South Korea, Burma,
Mongolia, China, and Hong Kong. Nepal, Bangladesh and
Pakistan are also users. ASIASAT provides basic telephone
service, television distribution and international business
data transmission. ASIASAT plans the launch of a second
satellite in 1993 or 1994.125
It is possible that at least one or more of these regional
systems has permitted military use of its satellite capabilities;
however, a closer examination of these systems and their
usage must be left for another day.
4. Other Commercial Satellite Services
The list of commercial satellite service providers includes:
PanAmSat, Shinawatra Sat. Co., APT Sat. Co. Ltd., TRW,
Hughes Galaxy, Embratel, Columbia Communications,1 2 6
COMSAT, GE Americom, AT&T Comm., GTE Spacenet,
American Satellite Corporation (ASC), Orion Satellite Cor-
poration, Qualcomm, Loral Systems (formerly Ford Aero-
space), Starsys Global Positioning, Inc., Orbital
Communications Corp., Teledesic, and Alascom.1 2 7
As the United States Signatory to both the INTELSAT
and INMARSAT organizations, COMSAT offers the full
range of services offered by those organizations in addition
to various enhancements of those services. COMSAT is the
largest user of INTELSAT and INMARSAT services and
holds the largest "ownership" share in those organiza-
12 Martin, supra note 33, at 69-70.
126 MCI and Columbia Communications were awarded a $100 million DoD con-
tract to construct a telecommunications network in the Pacific. Columbia will carry
voice and data between Korea, Guam, Hawaii, Japan, Okinawa, and the U.S. See
David Hartshorn, The Best Offense is a Good Defense ... Market, SATELLrrE COMM., Nov.
1992, at 42-3.
127 Morgan, supra note 40; TELECOMMUNICATIONS Rae., Mar. 28, 1994, at 6.
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tions. 128 COMSAT is a $564 million per year business with
over $1.5 billion in assets. 29
"COMSAT Mobile Communications is the only INMAR-
SAT Signatory to offer full, four ocean region, global cover-
age for INMARSAT-A services using its own facilities."'30
COMSAT Mobile offers fleet management services, includ-
ing navigation and position reporting, accounting and ad-
ministrative programming, fleet management tools to
facilitate inventory control, scheduled maintenance and
spare parts, and meteorological and safety services.' 3'
COMSAT's MARISAT Satellite Communications System is
used by both the U.S. and U.K. Navies. About 600 U.S. Navy
vessels are equipped to use MARISAT. 132
PanAmSat (Alpha Lyracom) was organized in 1984 to
provide services between the US and Latin America, but did
not launch its first satellites until 1988.133 It now has the
capacity to provide television and data distribution not only
to Latin America and North America, but to most of Eu-
rope as well.' 34 Its satellite (PASI) has six Ku-band tran-
sponders connecting the U.S. and Europe, five C-band
transponders connecting the U.S. and South America, and
twelve C-band transponders for other regional use. 13 5
PanAmSat plans on developing a constellation of six
satellites.13 1
Orion Satellite Corporation, an international telecom-
munications services and transmission facilities provider, in-
128 See 1992 COMSAT ANN. REP. COMSAT reported it held a 21.8% share of IN-
TELSAT in 1992. INMARSAT reports that COMSAT held a 23% ownership share in
1993.
12 1992 COMSAT ANN. REP. (1992). COMSAT Mobile Communications reported
growth in revenues of $10 million in 1992 for land mobile services and revenues
over $1 million in aeronautical communications services.
130 THE MOBILE SATELLrrE COMMUNICATIONS REVOLUTION, supra note 111, at 10.
131 Id. at 9.
12 JANE'S MILrrARY COMMUNICATIONS 305 (13th ed. 1992). Jane's notes that the
commercial shipping portion of MARISAT served as the forerunner to INMARSAT.
Both the U.S. and UK Navies utilize special UHF. frequencies of MARISAT. Id.
122 Martin, supra note 33, at 63.
14 Id. at 65.
1- DCA Draft, supra note 33, at 2-6.
136 Id.
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itially offered international communications services using
INTELSAT capacity. It plans to build its own satellites in
Europe and obtained FCC approval to launch and operate
them in 1990.137 It plans to launch two satellites in 1994.138
Orien's satellites are Ku-band with multiple spot beams
which cover the high density regions of the US and
Europe. 139
The following commercial satellite providers in the
United States are developing global mobile communica-
tions systems: 4 ° Iridium, essentially sponsored by Motor-
ola, will offer a constellation of sixty-six low earth orbit
satellites to link hand-held wireless phones anywhere in the
world.
American Mobile Satellite Corp. will offer hand-held
phones, through its planned Mobilsat GSO system, linking
the U.S., Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.
Ellipsat will offer global communications using mobile
capabilities via a constellation of sixteen satellites.
TRW will offer a twelve-satellite system named Odessey
linking hand-held phones throughout 90% of the world.
Globalstar will utilize 48 satellites to provide world-wide
paging, voice, data, and fax services.
Cellsat, developed by Loral Space systems, will use three
satellites to provide voice, data, and video to hand-held
units within the U.S. and twenty-one other satellites for
global service.
Constellation Communications intends to establish a
global mobile communications system similar to Iridium.
Calling Communications will concentrate on providing
fixed telephony to lesser developed nations through a 480-
satellite system.
Qualcom foresees a Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite ex-
tension of its present terrestrial cellular telephone system.
It presently provides Radio Determination Satellite Service
137 Martin, supra note 33, at 76.
' DGA Draft, supra note 33, at 2-6.
139 Id.
140 Sugawara, supra note 99, at 71.
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(RDSS) in the U.S., Europe and Japan via Ku-band tran-
sponders leased from domestic, regional and foreign na-
tional carriers. 41
Orbital Communications Corporation is developing an
ORBCOMM LEO satellite system of 20-24 satellites that
could provide global messaging service. 142
Leosat Corporation plans a LEOsat system to provide
messaging service.' 43
AT&T is developing a Telstar satellite system "tailored to
government applications" with one GSO satellite covering
the U.S. with a global beam and two satellites to provide
global non-polar coverage. 44
The U.S.'s Microsoft and McCaw Cellular Corporations
announced an ambitous plan to build a $10 billion, 840-
satellite Teledesic system, which could provide universal
broadband services to 95% of the earth's surface.'45
COMSAT, PanAmSat and Alascom are known to have
provided the military certain services during regional con-
flicts' 46 and it may be assumed that the military will con-
sider using the services of the developing global mobile
communications systems. In fact, COMSAT holds numerous
contracts with the U.S. military. 147 Columbia Communica-
tions has also contracted with DoD.
14, DCA Draft, supra note 33, at 2-9.
142 Id. Orbcom has completed construction of its first two satellites and has indi-
cated it may build up to 36 satellites. Starsys Wants Orbcomm Experimental Authority
Rescinded, TELECOMMUNICATIONS RE., Apr. 25, 1994, at 42.
14 DCA Draft, supra note 33, at 2-9.
144 DCA Draft, supra note 33, at 2-8. TELECOMMUNICATIONS REP., No. 47, Nov. 22,
1993, at 48.
145 TELECOMMUNICATION REPORTS, March 28, 1994, at 6.
,46 PanAmSat and Alascom carried certain military traffic during the U.S. invasion
of Panama, "Operation Just Cause."
147 1992 COMSAT ANN. REP. 3 lists contracts COMSAT has with the U.S. Defense
Commercial Communications Office (DECCO), the U.S. Military Sealift Command,
U.S. Army Space Command, the U.S. Marine Corps, and the U.S. Navy. DECCO is
DoD's contracting agent for Automatic Data Processing Equipment and long-haul
communications. Each of the U.S. military services has authority to contract for
similar services.
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C. MILITARY SATELLITE USE DURING REGIONAL CONFLICTS
"Information, in all its forms, is the keystone of future
success."
148
INMARSAT services were used successfully during the
Persian Gulf War 149 and even provided the Iraqis the ability
to contact coalition forces for coordination during Opera-
tion "Provide Comfort."' Some estimate that "half of the
satellite communications in the region were provided by
commercial satellites."' Coalition forces, which included
the largest naval fleet constituted since WWII, 1 2 were sup-
ported by "the most sophisticated information network ever
designed . . . dwarfing anything generated in previous
wars."' 53  Approximately 700,000 telephone calls and
152,000 messages per day were passed along satellite, micro-
wave, and landlines at the height of the conflict. 154 Com-
mercial communications satellites were admittedly used to
pass command and control information. 5
INMARSAT supplemented Naval vessel (including war-
ships) military communications and INTELSAT made the
links with U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia.' 56 Virtually all the
ships assigned to the Maritime Interdiction Force, includ-
ing most of the aircraft carriers, command support, and
hospital ships assigned to the Gulf, that blockaded Iraq dur-
ing the Persian Gulf War had INMARSAT terminalsinstalled. 1 7
148 Petersen, supra note 9, at 85.
119 Dubbed by the military as "Operation Desert Storm."
150 JohnJ. Meyer III,JTFCommunications: The Way Ahead, MIL. REV., March 1993, at
85.
15' Hartshorn, supra note 126, at 42.
152 Of the 359 ships used in Desert Shield/Storm, 212 were chartered (180 flew
non-US flags) and 12 were on loan from US allies. Robin E. Rathbun, Strategic Mobil-
ity for the 1990's: Mobility Requirements Study, STRATEGIC REV., Summer 1992.
153 Petersen, supra note 9, at 86, 92, n.7.
'5 Petersen, supra note 9, at 86.
155 Rand Study, supra note 25, at 8 (quoting the comments of General James Cass-
ity, Director of Command, Control, and Communications (C31) Systems for the
Joint Staff set forth in C41 Report, Oct. 15, 1990, at 2).
1-6 Hartshorn, supra note .126, at 42.
157 DoD to Expand Commercial Satcom Use, DEF. & AEROSPACE ELECrRONICS, May 11,
1992.
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INMARSAT was used for communications between U.S.
and British warships. 158 Many Navy ships were, however,
unable to receive war-related Cable News Network (CNN)
broadcasts because they did not have the right equipment,
forcing the Navy to send copies of these relatively important
video-taped broadcasts, made aboard the Carrier Ranger, to
be distributed by courier."' Most U.S. ships did not have
facsimile transmission capabilities. a60 Moreover, significant
communications circuit incompatibilities existed between
Navy and U.S. Air Force units, slowing the implementation
of the daily Air Tasking Orders that denominated allied
targets. 161
INMARSAT satellites, accessed by portable ground termi-
nals, were used to transmit still electronic photos of almost
"newspaper quality" of U.S. Gulf war forces to senior DoD
officials.' 62
Trojan SPIRIT (Special Purpose Integrated Remote Intel-
ligence Terminal), a modular satellite communications
package mounted on a trailer, which allowed virtual instan-
taneous direct communications between the front and con-
trol officers in the U.S., was one of the most successful
communications systems used during "Desert Storm."1 63
Some of the fourteen Trojan SPIRIT units, operated by the
US Army, were towed by truck alongside armor into Kuwait
or airlifted by Chinook Helicopters. 64  Deutsche
Bundespost Telekom, Germany's INTELSAT Signatory,
provided the links from Trojan SPIRIT to the two INTEL-
SAT satellites repositioned for the war.' 65 The U.S. Army
wants to keep the $11 million Trojan SPIRIT system be-
- Rand Study, supra note 25, at 4.
159 Petersen, supra note 10, at 87.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 86.
162 Kiernan & Sanders, supra note 2, at 170. INMARSAT Satellite to Aid US Commu-
nications in Gulf War, DEF. NEWS, Jan. 21, 1991, at 13.
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cause it is needed and complements other DoD
networks. 166
Four INTELSAT satellites were used to support the Gulf
war.
INTELSAT added 1250 voice and data circuits for public
phone and facsimile; added 600 International Business Ser-
vice (IBS, private network) circuits; supported thirty-three
U.S. licensed and one UK licensed transportable earth sta-
tions; added a VSAT network consisting of 14 spoke termi-
nals in Saudi Arabia and a hub station in Germany; [and]
[S]upported approximately 118.4 Mbps in additional traffic
to/from Saudi Arabia during this crisis.167
"In the first ten minutes of the war, we took out 50 com-
mand and control targets."168 The U.S. Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff announced that the U.S. had targeted
Iraq's communications facilities during the war, focusing
on its military command and control network.1 69 I believe
that Iraq's earth stations, which linked it with INTELSAT
and INTERSPUTNIK had been destroyed.1 70 Iraq's com-
mand and control centers were attacked again two years af-
ter the war, in Operation "Southern Watch," the purpose of
which was to enforce the "no-fly" zone in Southern Iraq.171
The U.S. NAVSTAR GPS satellites were heavily used dur-
ing Desert Storm, enabling huge numbers of vehicle to
"navigate surely across the featureless Iraqi desert in the
middle of sandstorm, regularly surprising Iraqi forces ...
[t]he defining 'left hook' which enclosed Saddam Hussein's
armored divisions was possible only through the use of
- Army Officials Seek to Continue Wartime Data Network, SPACE NEWS, Sept. 8, 1991,
at 24.
167 DCA Draft, supra note 33.
- Military Eyes CRAF-like System for Commercial Satellites, AEROSPACE NEWS, Feb. 21,
1992, at 285.
169 Kathleen Killette, Iraq Net Critical Target, COMM. WEEK, Jan. 21, 1991, at 60.
170 Author's discussion with COMSAT officials, in October 1993. War Drives Up
Demand for Satellite Communications, Remote Sensing, COMM. DALY, Jan. 18, 1991, at 4,
notes that Iraq's key INTELSAT earth stations had ceased transmissions. It was not
clear if the three earth stations were destroyed or shut down by the Iraqis. Kuwait's
INTELSAT link was cut, Aug. 2, 1989, the day of the Iraqi invasion.
171 Petersen, supra note 9, at 90.
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10,000 recreational boating GPS units bought off-the-shelf
. "... 9172 GPS was used to guide U.S. Air Force air-launched
cruise missiles, hundreds of miles away from their targets,
and to guide Navy land-attack missiles. 173 Both DoD's DSCS
and DMSP (Defense Meteorological satellite Program)
were heavily used, with DSCS providing about 75% of all
inter-theater connectivity as well as intratheater support in
areas not covered by terrestrial systems.' 7 1
During the war, the 2nd U.S. Marine Corps Air Wing
used a $9 million Macsat experimental satellite to transmit
twenty to thirty pages of logistics data daily, using its "store-
and-forward" capacity. 175
The Pentagon relied on the French SPOT satellite im-
agery system to such an extent that some speculated it was
monopolizing access to preclude others from obtaining the
information.176
Alascom, a U.S. commercial satellite communications
company, airlifted ten transportable satellite earth stations,
which included vans and dishes for voice and two-way data,
to the Persian Gulf between August 1989 and January
1991.77 Under contract with the U.S. Army, Alascom's
transportable satellite terminals were immediately deployed
and used for tactical applications in Panama during Opera-
tion 'Just Cause." 7 8 INMARSAT was used, as it was in De-
sert Storm, to transmit voice and still electronic photos. 79
The U.S. Navy used INTELSAT capability to "plug into"
Bangladesh's public switched network in Operation "Sea
Angel" after it had been hit by a typhoon.8 0 Within mili-
172 Id. at 85.
17 Id. at 85.
174 Space Communications Links for War Required Significant Effort, AEROSPACE NEWS,
July 24, 1991, at 126.
17- Marines Use Macsats in Mideast, SPACE NEWS, Sept. 1990, at 4 (cited in Rand
Study, supra note 25, at 21).
176 KH-I Is Show Iraq Hit Hard; War Drives Up Demand for Satellite Communications,
Remote Sensing, CoMm. DALY, Jan. 18, 1991, at 4.
177 COMM. DAILY, Jan. 23, 1991, at 10.
7Rand Study, supra note 25, at 7.
179 Id. at 7-8.
180 Hartshorn, supra note 126, at 39.
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tary circles, it is likewise known that both the United King-
dom and Argentina used INMARSAT capabilities during
the Falklands conflict.'81 Iraq used INMARSAT in its war
with Iran.1 2 All are Parties to the INTELSAT and INMAR-
SAT Agreements.
INTELSAT has agreed to provide the United Nations
peacekeeping forces free satellite capacity anywhere in the
world.'8 5 INMARSAT's mobile satellite services were heavily
used in the early days of the United Nation's operation in
Somalia." 4 United Nations trucks and vehicles in Bosnia
are relying on INMARSAT mobile communications serv-
ices.' 85 U.S. Army medical units are keeping an INMARSAT
portable satellite transmitter on hand, as backup, should
the landlines in Croatia fail.'8 6
As of May 1992, the U.S. Navy had seventy INMARSAT
terminals on its ships" 7 and was installing two to three per
month with a goal of outfitting the entire fleet by 1995.18
"On any given day the U.S. Navy has 110 ships forward
deployed." 8 9 To by-pass overcrowded tactical communica-
tions channels, the U.S. Navy is increasing use of its IN-
MARSAT-based Streamlined Alternative Logistics
181 Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations (ATTN: OP-943C) by the
Deputy Assistant Judge Advocate General International Law, Jan. 14, 1991.
182 Id.
183 1992 INTELSAT ANN. REP. Rand Study, supra note 25, at 30.
- Soldiers Rely On INMARSAT In Somalia, SPACE NEws, Jan. 4, 1993, at 1, 21. The
article notes that Mobile Telesystems (Gaithersburg, Md.) alone provided some 30
phones to the U.S. government and 10 to other users in late December 1992-early
January 1993. Id.
185 THE MOBILE SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS REVOLUTION, supra note 111, at 6.
-8 Ellen Messmer, MASH Units in Croatia Get Medical Advice from Home; Telemedicine
System Puts Experts at the Scene, NETWORK WORLD, June 7, 1993, at 26.
187 According to the Rand Study, INMARSAT terminals are installed on 28 war-
ships, 14 carriers, 45 mobile sealift ships and two hospital ships of the U.S. Navy.
INMARSAT Usefulness Piques Navy Interest, SPACE NEWS, July 15, 1991, at 8.
188 DoD to Expand Commercial Satcom Use, DEF. & AEROSPACE ELECTRONICS, May 11,
1992. In a telephone interview, in November 1993, NTIA officials informed the au-
thor that the US Navy had 200-300 terminals on its ships, the US Army was utilizing
over 100 terminals, the White House Communications Agency had more than 50
terminals and the other military services were also making use of Inmarsat
capabilities.
189 Thomas C. Linn, Naval Forces in the Post-Cold WarEra, STRATEGIC REV., Fall 1992,
at 20.
270 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [60
Transmission System (SALTS) to improve logistics sup-
port.190 The U.S. "Navy's information-handling capacity has
increased 100% over that available during Desert Storm."
191 Captain E.R. Enterline, Director of the Navy's Space Sys-
tems Division, recognized that, "Military success has always
belonged to the best-informed force. " 19 2
I believe, as I will explain later, that international law has
evolved to the extent that the military uses of the commer-
cial communications satellite services, discussed above, in
Somalia, Bangladesh, Operation Desert Storm, Bosnia, and
Croatia, were lawful.
D. DoD's DRIVE TowARD COMMERCIAL SATELLITE USAGE
"The U.S. military is being forced to consider innovative
technologies and war plans to counter new weaponry
emerging around the world as commercially available tech-
nology is fused into potentially lethal combinations."1 93
Faced with declining budgets, manpower cuts and explod-
ing demand for information, DoD plans to dramatically in-
crease its use of off-the-shelf satellite communications
systems. 194 DoD "can no longer afford the luxury of owning
all of their SATCOM .... capability... [T] he only thing off-
limits will be classified reconnaissance systems and some
other 'highly survivable' systems."'95 "Commercial systems
are the obvious first place to look to economically achieve
expanded capabilities." 196 The private sector's advanced ex-
pertise is also driving DoD toward commercial satellite
usage. 197
190 Id.
191 Petersen, supra note 9, at 90.
192 DoD to Expand Commercial Satcom Use, supra note 188, at 4.
193 Neil Munro, Pentagon Braces for New High-Technology Threats, DEF. NEWS, Sept. 6,
1993, at 3.
194 DoD to Expand Commercial Satcom Use, supra note 188.
195 Id.
- JohnJ. Meyer III, JTF Communications: The WayAhead, MIL. REV., March 1993, at
94.
197 Hartshorn, supra note 126, at 39. DoD is interested in high data rates, video
delivery, and very small aperture terminals (VSATs).
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The DoD's policy had always been to use commercial
communications satellites to carry about one-third of its
long-haul communications. Since most of the traffic was ad-
ministrative, few questions were asked.198 In fact, one
source estimates that DoD spends about $160 million per
year on national and international satellite services.' 99
A study for the U.S. Army, conducted by Rand, con-
cluded that there were, in general, either no or minimal
impediments to military use of commercial communication
satellite services.2 ° ° Competition between commercial prov-
iders has improved service, increased capacity, reduced
costs, and "lessened political resistance to handling military
traffic."20 1 Much military message traffic is encrypted. The
identity of user ships is unknown to INMARSAT, and it is
unlikely that INMARSAT (or INTELSAT) knows the con-
tent of military communications. 2  Furthermore, the U.S.
and its allies share a great deal of control over INTELSAT
and INMARSAT because of their weighted voting structures
and thus have large roles in determining the organizations'
positions on military usage.
Increased use of commercial communications satellites is
suggested by the National Space Council's space policy
guidelines of February 8, 1990. Those guidelines en-
courage government agencies to use them "to the fullest
extent feasible" and in a "cost-effective" manner.20 3
The shortcomings of the U.S. satellite communications
capabilities discovered during the Gulf War, including the
shortage of Ultra High Frequency (UHF) links, lack of se-
cure capacity, lack of area coverage, and limited ability to
communicate with commercial shipping, are important fac-
tors in the search for obtaining commercial capacity. A Pen-
tagon post-mortem of the war said that significant effort was
required to maintain adequate space-based communica-
198 Rand Study, supra note 25, at 7.
199 DCA Draft, supra note 33, at A-2.
200 Rand Study, supra note 25.
201 Id. at v.
0 Id. at 32.
-0 Id. at iii.
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tions capabilities among coalition forces and identified the
need to improve the use of space-based communications
support by tactical commanders in their operational
plans.2 °4
The U.S. House of Representatives Appropriations Com-
mittee has directed DoD to use commercial communica-
tions satellites more frequently, in an effort to save money,
as part of DoD's overhaul of the way it runs space pro-
grams.20 5 The Committee cut funding for DoD's MILSTAR
(Military Strategic and Tactical Relay Satellite System) pro-
gram, but asked DoD to develop a low-cost series of satel-
lites for tactical communications once the MILSTAR
constellation is in orbit.206
The U.S. military market for commercial satellite com-
munications was expected to grow to over $2 billion in 1992
and remain close to that level through 1996.207 In July
1992, DoD contracted with Space Systems/Loral, Hughes
Aircraft and COMSAT to study military uses for commercial
satellite networks. The study, the Commercial Satellite
Communications Initiative (CSCI), is intended to reduce
DoD telecommunications costs and diversify its satellite
communications capabilities. 8
2o4 Space Communication Links for War Required Significant Effort, AEROSPACE NEWS,
July 24, 1991, at 126.
- Andrew Lawler, House Panel Tells Pentagon to Overhaul Space Programs, DEF.
NEws, Sept. 27, 1993. To force DoD to save by leasing commercial communications
satellites in a coordinated manner, the Committee cut $100 million from DoD's
Operation and Maintenance funds.
-o Id.
207 David Hartshorn, The Best Offense is a Good Defense . . . Market, SATELLITE
COMM., Nov. 1992, at 39. According to a Frost & Sullivan report cited by Hartshorn,
in 1991, the USAF spent $1.111 billion, the Army spent $84.5 million, the Navy spent
$412 million, and Defense Agencies spent $1.2 billion, for satellite communications
and another $2 billion for support programs. In 1989, the U.S. spent approximately
0.35% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on military space programs and about
0.2% on civil space programs while the U.S.S.R. spent roughly 0.6% and 0.5% re-
spectively, followed by France, the EEC, Italy, Germany, Japan, U.K. and Canada in
terms of the biggest spenders.
"B COMM. DAILY, Oct. 9, 1992, at 9. Hartshorn, supra note 207, at 46. The CSCI
Study is designed to answer: which services could support DoD users; what cost-re-
duction opportunities exist; how can DoD and commercial communications systems,
both satellite and terrestrial, be interfaced; and, how can DoD be assured of commu-
nications system access.
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A 1991 Defense Communications Agency (DCA) study of
the potential uses of commercial communications satellites
recommended the creation of "[a] domestic and interna-
tional commercial-based Private (dedicated) General Pur-
pose Fixed [and Mobile] Satellite Service Network [using
INTELSAT, INMARSAT, regional systems, and private serv-
ices] to meet growing general purpose requirements not
satisfied by the current or planned Defense Satellite Com-
munications System [UHF and EHF] (DSCS) SHF MIL-
SATCOM systems. ' '20 9 The study concluded that, "[G] eneral
purpose SATCOM requirements are estimated to far ex-
ceed the existing and planned capacity of the military MIL-
SATCOM systems . . . [which could require] up to one
billion bits per second of additional general purpose capac-
ity .. . by 2010.1121
The DCA Study identified benefits of utilizing commer-
cial programs, including: their ability to handle "surge" ca-
pacity for crises and low-intensity general purpose
requirements; their continuity of service capabilities; their
enhancement of the diversity of MILSATCOM's Architec-
ture; their available VSAT applications; their ability to trans-
mit at higher data rates than that supported on DSCS (up
to 150 Mbps versus 100 Mbps on DSCS);2 11 realization of
cost-savings through bulk or discounted acquisitions; re-
moving DSCS users who do not need the DSCS survivability
features in order to provide greater access to DSCS by tacti-
cal warfighting users; satisfying previously deferred require-
ments and meeting newly emerging requirements. 2 12 The
study noted that command link encryption is a capacity on
all new U.S. commercial satellites and is provided by IN-
TELSAT and INMARSAT, as well.2 1' The study suggested
2- Recommended Role for Commercial SATCOM Systems in an Integrated MILSATCOM
Architecture, Defense Communications Agency, OSD Review Draft, July 15, 1991, at
ES-1 & ES-2.
210 Id. at ES-3.
211 DCA Draft, supra note 33, at 1-2.
212 OSD Review Draft, supra note 209, at ES-2.
215 DCA Draft, supra note 33, at 5-8. Command link encryption deals with the
control of satellites. The Study notes that most systems also have multiple, dis-
persed, "back-up" control facilities.
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that commercial satellites, in geosynchronous orbit are just
as likely to survive various anti-satellite threats as are mili-
tary satellites. 14 The study recommended, in addition to
procuring permanently assigned capacity, that DoD obtain
pre-paid contingency capacity as well.2 15
The DCA suggested that Motorola's IRIDIUM and
Loral's CELLSAT could meet DoD requirements for
handheld "man-portable" voice terminals with connectivity
to both the PSN and government switched network from
anywhere in the world. 6 DCA noted that the National Se-
curity Agency (NSA) is working with Motorola on incorpo-
rating secure-voice telephone capability on IRIDIUM. 7
The U.S. Navy has expressed interest in Motorola's IRID-
IUM system and the CELSAT system, noting that use of
those systems by the military would require encryption. 1 8
The DoD may soon go to the private sector for its encryp-
tion systems, as well.21 9
The U.S. Navy is considering a CRAF-like (Civil Reserve
Air Fleet) system applicable to commercial communications
satellites to mobilize them quickly for military use in future
conflicts. 220 The Defense Communications Agency, in a
1991 study, also referred to the possibility of developing a
CRAF-like system called the Commercial Reserved Space
System Program (CRSSP), proposed by USSPACECOM, to
obtain capacity for surge requirements.221 The biggest
drawback to the CRSSP would be the payments needed to
offset lost commercial capacity. However, the advantages
214 Id. at 2-3.
215 Id. at 5-8.
216 Id.
217 OSD Review Draft, supra note 209, at ES-3.
218 DoD To Expand Commercial SatCom Use, supra note 188, at 4. The Navy noted it
is interested in Direct Broadcast TV satellites for multi-channel imagery and com-
mercial news and entertainment.
219 Hartshorn, supra note 126, at 47.
220 Military Eyes CRAF-like System for Commercial Satellites, AEROSPACE DAILY, Feb. 21,
1992, at 285. Under the CRAF program, the military pays a portion of the cost of
constructing airliners which are readily convertible to carrying cargo or troops for
military purposes. The aircraft are then used to backup military airlift in wartime.
221 DCA Draft, supra note 33, at 6-2.
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would include the ability to add military features, such as
hard-limited commercial band transponders for mitigation
of 'Jamming," and the availability of that capacity (which
would revert to military control in crises).222
The Rand Study pointed out several advantages to the
military of using commercial communications satellites, in-
cluding the avoidance of development costs, the relatively
small investment needed, the availability of excess capacity,
the ability to cut across military service boundaries (e.g., Air
Force to Navy), their compatibility with existing military sys-
tems, their interoperability with commercial users and al-
lied forces, their ability to withstand the rigors of space, the
ability to encrypt traffic and limited jam-resistance. 2 3
The Rand Study envisions a system, combining INTEL-
SAT and INMARSAT usage, that would give commanders at
both the Pentagon and major headquarters complete com-
munications with deployed units globally and that would
permit tactical use.224 The Study states that privately-owned
U.S. companies are not restricted from serving military
users by any government regulations and that they, like the
international organizations, which are not precluded from
serving the military, are more motivated to maximize reve-
nues than question military usage of their services. 22 5
In addition to recommending increased INTELSAT and
INMARSAT usage, the Rand Study suggests that the military
could benefit from private networks offering "hub and re-
mote site" services presently used by business. The hub
would be an Army headquarters and the remote sites would
be equipped with VSATs at deployed units, such as field
hospitals, ammunition, fuel and supply depots.226
The Rand Study concludes that the military is likely to
use commercial communications satellite systems more and
with greater frequency. The military should therefore plan
- Id. at 6-2.
-3 Rand Study, supra note 25, at 4-5, 9-10.
-4 Id. at 23-24.
-5 Id. at 28-29.
226 Id. at 13-14.
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for and exploit such use rather than allowing the next crisis
to dictate the need.227
The U.S. DoD is not alone in its search for communica-
tions satellite technology that has both civilian and military
applications. DoD is closely watching Pakistan and India's
satellite business aspirations. 228 Furthermore, with pressure
to surrender control of its GPS system to the Department of
Transportation and open it to commercial users, DoD is
concerned about hostile groups obtaining access, which
might allow them to guide weapons and attacks against the
U.S. and its allies. 229
PART II. INMARSAT, INTELSAT & COMSAT
A. INMARSAT
1. Functions
The International Maritime Satellite Organization (IN-
MARSAT) operates nine or more satellites, located over the
three major oceans, to provide ship-to-shore and shore-to-
ship communications services. It was created over seven-
teen years ago to provide satellite communications capabili-
ties for the maritime community. It began operations in
February 1982, using MARISAT (U.S.), MARECS (ESA) and
INTELSAT leased capacity. 230 Any state may become a
member2 31 and ships of all nations, including nonmembers,
may utilize its services.232 INMARSAT has "legal personality"
and the capacity to enter into agreements with States and
international organizations. 3
227 Id. at 38-39.
-8 Hartshorn, supra note 126, at 47.
229 Lisa Burgess & Neil Munro, Pentagon Fears Loss of GPS Control, DEF. NEws, Aug.
2, 1993, at 8.
230 United States Space Law, National and International Regulation, International Regu-
lation II.C.3, Report of the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration
and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Vienna, Aug. 9, 1982, at 83.
231 INMARSAT Convention, art. 32(1).
292 INMARSAT Convention, art. 7(1).
222 INMARSAT Convention, art. 25. INMARSAT is likewise responsible for its acts
and obligations.
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About 96% of international commodity trading is carried
by a global fleet of over sixty thousand ships belonging to
over thirty nations, 70% of which are at sea at any given
time.23 4 With such major investments in these vessels, ship-
owners could ill-afford to be out of touch with them. How-
ever, that was the case with the radio communications
available until the advent of the INMARSAT system.23 5
Although INTELSAT had been in existence for years, the
technology for mobile satellite communications had not yet
been developed.
INMARSAT provides "space-segment," e.g., the satellites,
telemetry, tracking, command and control facilities, while
ship owners (or other users) must obtain their own
shipborne or mobile earth terminals.23 6 INMARSAT mem-
bers own and operate coast earth stations.2 v INMARSAT
controls the network from London.238 Recently, INMAR-
SAT has expanded its service into aeronautical and land-
mobile communications.
2. Genesis
The Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organiza-
tion (IMCO)23 9 recognized the potential applicability of
space-based communications as early as 1966.240 IMCO's
234 NANDASIRI JASENTULIYANA & Roy S. LEE, MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 439 (1979).
There are approximately 80,000 ships today according to a speaker at the Ge-
orgetown University Law Center, Maritime Law Symposium, Nov. 29, 1993.
235 "Shore-based VHF coast stations can only reach out to about 50 km. Shore-
based MF stations are good to about 160 Km. Short wave communications (HF) ...
can be used for long-range calls. '[B]ut it's fairly low quality'. . . (and) subject to
interference, congestion, irregular coverage and a lack of privacy," according to IN-
MARSAT Director General, Olof Lundberg. Guy M. Stephens, Maritime Pays the
Freight, SATELLITE COMM., March 1989, at 13.
2-6 Usually, large ships, e.g., oil tankers, bulk carriers, container ships, passenger
liners, yachts, fishing boats and other vessels, use INMARSAT "Standard A" termi-
nals. The smaller "Standard C" terminals are used on smaller ships, trucks, and air-
craft. INMARSAT System, JANES' SATELLITES, at 89.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 IMCO is a United Nations' Organization.
2- JASENTULIYANA & LEE, supra note 234, at 439. An IMCO panel of experts identi-
fied some of the reasons for establishing a system which could improve reliability,
quality, and speed of communications. See also Sessional Act of the International Confer-
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Maritime Safety Committee decided to study satellite com-
munications. The 1967 World Administrative Radio Con-
ference (WARC) recommended IMCO pursue such a study
as well.2 41 The Maritime Safety Committee, through its sub-
committee on Radiocommunications and a Panel of Ex-
perts on Maritime Satellites, performed the detailed tasks
and recommended an international conference. In No-
vember 1973, the 80-member IMCO Assembly convened a
conference to consider establishing an international mari-
time satellite system. 42
In November 1972, the U.S.S.R. submitted a document,
"Provisional Principles for the Establishment of an Interna-
tional Organization for a Maritime Satellite Service," which
provided a basis for discussions. 43 Many of the U.S.S.R.
document's provisions were incorporated into the IMCO
panel of expert's 244 September 1974 report, which formed a
basis for the conference's work and the later two agree-
ments proposed by the conference. 45
IMCO's International Conference on the Establishment
of an International Maritime Satellite System first session
convened in April 1975.46 The conference came to a
"broad consensus on a number of basic principles," but was
unable to resolve all the issues. The conference, therefore,
decided to hold a second session and leave further prepara-
tory work to an "intersessional working group."247 The in-
tersessional group held three meetings and had a complete
draft set of articles for the second meeting of the Confer-
ence, which approved the complete text of the Convention
ence on the Establishment of an International Maritime Satellite System, MARSAT/Conf/10
(1975).
241 JASENTULIYANA & LEE, supra note 234, at 439.
242 United States Space Law, National and International Regulation, International Regu-
lation II.C.3, supra note 230, at 82. IMCO Resolution A.305 (VIII), Nov. 23, 1973.
242 GENNADY ZHUKOV & YuRi KOSLOSOV, INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAw (1984).
244 The Panel of Experts met six times between July 3, 1972 to Sept. 6, 1974. Its
eighteen members were: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, F.R.G., Libe-
ria, Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, U.S.S.R.,
U.K. and the U.S. JASENTULWVANA & LEE, supra note 234, at 458 n.ll.
245 ZHUKOV & KoSLOSOV, supra note 243, at 123.
246 INMARSAT BASIC DOCUMENTS, 3 (1989).
247 JASENTULIYANA & LEE, supra note 234 at 441-42.
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and Operating Agreement in February 1976.248 In Septem-
ber 1976, the forty-eight nations attending the last of three
sessions of the conference unanimously agreed that an in-
ternational maritime satellite communications organization
should be formed.249 The conference adopted two agree-
ments: a Convention on the International Maritime Satel-
lite Organization and an Operating Agreement on
INMARSAT.2 50 The Agreements were opened for ratifica-
tion in 1976 and entered into force in July 1979.251 The
original membership of fifteen nations has grown to sev-
enty-two nations.
A divergence of views existed throughout the early nego-
tiations about whether INMARSAT should be a commercial
enterprise or a public service organization.252 Initially, the
United States had proposed that INTELSAT be used to pro-
vide the required maritime services for the proposed new
system, since it opposed creating a new international organ-
ization. There was no support, however, for that proposal
nor the U.S. proposal that a satellite consortium be
formed. 53
At the time, a number of major seafaring nations, such as
the U.S.S.R. and China, were not INTELSAT members and
their absence from an organization serving maritime com-
munications was perceived to be a serious disadvantage. 25 4
INTELSAT's Board of Governors' weighted voting proce-
dures were seen as a potential limitation on the influence
that lesser developed countries might have over the direc-
tion of a maritime system. 255 Furthermore, the European
nations and major seafaring nations looked for an organiza-
tion which would contribute to safety at sea, public commu-
248 Id. at 442.
249 INMARSAT System, JANES' SATELLITES, at 89.
25 United States Space Law, National and International Regulation, International Regu-
lation II.C.3, supra note 230, at 82.
25, INMARSAT System, JANES' SATELLITES, at 89.
252 JASENTULYANA & LEE, supra note 234, at 443.
253 Id. at 440-41.
2- Id. at 441.
255 Id.
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nications, and modern fleet management, more of a public
service organization.2 5 6 So, what emerged through compro-
mise was a "hybrid" institution which is neither an entirely
commercial enterprise nor a public service organization. 25 7
3. Structure & Relationships
Under the INMARSAT Convention, each nation or Party
to the Convention, may designate a "Signatory" or compe-
tent public or private entity to sign the Operating Agree-
ment.2 58 The relationship between the nation-Party and its
designated "Signatory" is then governed by that nation's do-
mestic law.25 9
In 1979, most of the Signatories were government-con-
trolled Postal Telegraph and Telephone (PTT) organiza-
tions. The U.S., however, designated COMSAT, a private
governmental organization, as its Signatory. While a "Party"
is not liable for obligations arising out of the Operating
Agreement,2 ° it is responsible for ensuring its Signatory ful-
fills its responsibilities.2 6 1 Likewise, each Signatory itself is
responsible for fulfilling obligations under the Convention
and Operating Agreement and for acting "consistently"
with them.262 Applications for use of INMARSAT space seg-
ment generally must be submitted through a Signatory,
who must ensure compliance with all INMARSAT
conditions. 63
256 Id.
2-" Id. at 443.
258 Nations may sign the Operating Agreement, or designate a competent entity to
do so, and become signatories, but only nations may sign the Convention and be-
come parties. INMARSAT Convention, art. 20.
259 INMARSAT Convention, art. 1, 2, & 4. INMARSAT BAsic DOCUMENTS, at 12-
14.
- INMARSAT Convention, art. 4(c).
262 INMARSAT Convention, art. 4(b). The U.S. regulates COMSAT's activities
under the International Maritime Satellite Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 751-
758 (1988).
262 Operating Agreement on the International Maritime Satellite Organization,
entered into force onJuly 16, 1979, art. II [hereinafter INMARSAT Operating Agree-
ment]. INMARSAT BAsic DOCUMENTS, 41 (1989).
262 INMARSAT Operating Agreement, supra note 262, at art. XV. INMARSAT BA-
Sic DOCUMENTS, 49 (1989).
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INMARSAT has three organs: the Assembly, the Council,
and the Directorate.2 64 The Directorate is responsible for
the day-to-day functioning of the organization. The Coun-
cil, consisting of twenty-two representatives of Signatories,
has the responsibility of making space segment available to
carry-out the Organization's purposes in the most eco-
nomic, effective and efficient manner consistent with the
Convention and Operating Agreement.2 65 The Council is
the predominant organ for making INMARSAT's opera-
tional decisions.2 66 The Assembly, in which each Party has
one vote, meets every two years, reviews INMARSAT's activi-
ties, policies, and long-term objectives, and ensures the Or-
ganization's activities are consistent with the Convention,
the United Nation's Charter,267 and any other treaties by
which INMARSAT is bound. 68
4. Purposes
The purpose of INMARSAT is set forth in Article 3269 of
the Convention:
(1) [t]o make provision for the space segment necessary for
improving maritime communications and, as practicable,
264 INMARSAT Convention, art. 9; INMARSAT BAsic DOCUMENTS, 16 (1989).
265 INMARSAT Convention, art. 15. Eighteen of the Council's members are desig-
nated on the basis of having the largest "investment shares" in INMARSAT. Each
Signatory on the Council has a voting participation equivalent to the investment
share(s) it represents. No one Signatory, however, may cast more than 25% of the
votes. INMARSAT Convention, art. 14. Investment shares are determined on the
basis of utilization of INMARSAT space segment. Operating Agreement, supra note
262, at art. V(1). The U.S. (COMSAT) originally had a 17% investment share. Oper-
ating Agreement, supra note 262, annex. INMARSAT BAsic DOCUMENTS, 52 (1989).
In 1993, the U.S. held a 23.062% investment share. INMARSAT Member States, Sig-
natories, Investment Shares and Council Membership As At the Forty-Sixth Session
of the Council, para. 24.2.3(a), SEC:C46SRA, Council/46/SR/FINAL, at 1.
26 JASENTULIYANA & LEE, supra note 234, at 447.
267 Article 27 of the INMARSAT Convention specifies that INMARSAT "shall coop-
erate" with the United Nations and other international organizations, on matters of
common interest.
26 INMARSAT Convention, art. 12. INMARSAT BAsic DOCUMENTS, 17 (1989).
Decisions on matters of "substance" are taken by a two-thirds majority, while proce-
dural matters require only a simple majority. INMARSAT Convention, art. 11.
269 Article 3 is in the process of being amended to include reference to Land
Mobile Communications and communications on waters "not part of the marine
environment." INMARSAT BAsic DOCUMENTS, 13 (1989).
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aeronautical communications, thereby assisting in improv-
ing communications for distress and safety of life, communi-
cations for air traffic services, the efficiency and
management of ships and aircraft, maritime and aeronauti-
cal public correspondence services and radiodetermination
capabilities.
(3) The Organization 270 shall act exclusively for peaceful
purposes.
INMARSAT Convention, art. 3 (emphasis added). The
earliest draft articles for the Organization stated that it
"shall act exclusively for peaceful purposes."2 71 The earliest
reports of the IMCO Panel of Experts on Maritime Satel-
lites illustrate that military ships were not explicitly antici-
pated users. 72 In early documents, the U.S., in fact, had
suggested INMARSAT would be for "merchant shipping."273
270 "The Organization" is INMARSAT. INMARSAT Convention, Art. 2(1). IN-
MARSAT BAsic DOCUMENTS, 13 (1989).
271 IMCO Panel of Experts On Maritime Satellites- 3d session, Agenda item 2,
MARSAT III/WP.7, Sept. 13, 1973. Its draft PART II, Purpose and Function, Article
2, third paragraph states, "[t]he Organization shall act exclusively for peaceful pur-
poses." At that same meeting, the French pointed out that the draft provided no
clear and precise reference to INMARSAT's mission. They proposed the following:
"[T] he Organization should aim to make available, without discrimination, to all sea
areas where there may be shipping routes and fishing grounds, the space segment
necessary for telecommunications services with ships, for the safety of maritime
transport and for the safeguard of human life at sea." MARSAT III/wP I, Sept. 11,
1973 (On file with CMS).
272 The Panel's report stated, "[i]n the early stages the ships likely to be participat-
ing are likely to be those of specialized types (e.g. tankers, container ships, large
passenger ships, etc.) . . .eventually .. . (a) vessels covered by the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1960; (b) fishing vessels... ; (c) scientific,
industrial and miscellaneous other units operating in marine environments." MAR-
SAT ES.I/39, Nov. 10, 1972, annex III, para. 2.1.2, at 2 (On file with CMS). Likewise,
the U.S. did not reference military vessels in its deliberations. See MARSAT 11/4/6,
April 24, 1973, Note By the Government of the United States of America, IMCO
Panel of Experts on Maritime Satellites, 2d Session, Agenda Item 4. The earliest
proposed definition of the term "ship" taken from art. (2) (4), International Conven-
tion for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (1973) was "a vessel of any type
whatsoever operating in the marine environment and includes hydrofoil boats, air-
cushioned vehicles, submersibles, floating craft and fixed or floating platforms."
Draft Convention, MARSAT IV/9, annex III, at 85 (On file with CMS). That is
largely the present definition found in the Convention.
273 "The United States believes there is an important need for improved maritime
communications;... the preponderantly international character of merchant ship-
ping support consideration of... [an INMXSAT]." MARSAT/CONF/5/3, Apr. 15,
1975, Note By the Government of the United States of America, IMCO International
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The comments of representatives from the U.K., India, and
Germany explicitly referenced "merchant shipping."274 The
first proposals for the Preamble by the Intersessional Work-
ing Group of the International IMCO Conference referred
to making provision for "the benefit of world shipping."2 75
The change to the present language was at the suggestion
of the U.S.27 6
A 1972 Soviet draft, "Principles for the Establishment of
an International Organization for a Maritime Satellite Ser-
vice" (INMARSAT), was a comprehensive document that
contained language similar to that found in many of the
present articles. The Soviets stated that the organization
should be in full compliance with UN General Assembly
Resolution 1721 (XVI) (use of outer space for peaceful pur-
poses) and that:
2. [Its activities]... shall be based on universally recognized
principles of international law, including the appropriate
provisions of the United Nations Charter as well as of the
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of ("Outer" omitted) Space, including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, concluded on 27 Jan-
uary 1967, and Geneva Conventions on Law of the Sea,
1958.
5. The Organization should promote the development of
shipping, the economical and social progress of peoples and
shall act exclusively for peaceful purposes. It should not
Conference on the Establishment of an International Maritime Satellite System,
1975, Agenda Item 6 (On file with CMS).
274 MARSAT/CONF/SR.3, April 14, 1975, Provisional Summary Record of the
Third Plenary Meeting, International Conference on the Establishment of an Inter-
national Maritime Satellite System, 1975, at 4-6 (On file with CMS).
275 ISWG 1/3, July 21, 1975, Consideration of Fundamental Principles, Working
Paper (on file with CMS). The Convention's Preamble now reads "Determined, to
this end to make provision for the benefit of ships of all nations ...."
27 Draft Convention on the International Maritime Satellite Organization (IN-
MARSAT), Proposed Draft Texts of Instruments, Note by the Government of the
USA, ISWG 11/2, Sept. 25, 1975, IMCO Inter-Sessional Working Group on Maritime
Satellites-2d Session (On file with CMS).
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permit the military use either directly or indirectly of the
technical means which will be at its disposal. 7
The above language concerning military use did not
make it beyond the Soviet draft Principles and was not in-
cluded in the first draft of the Convention submitted by the
IMCO Panel of Experts attached to its first report.2 78 How-
ever, document's the portions related to the Outer Space
Treaty, the Law of the Sea Convention, the UN Charter,
and acting "exclusively for peaceful purposes" were in-
cluded in a draft by the Panel of Experts, in May 1973.279
The "peaceful purposes" language persisted unscathed
throughout the entire negotiation as did the references to
the Outer Space Treaty and UNGA Resolution 1721 (XVI).
In April 1975 the U.S. submitted a proposed "Intergov-
ernmental Agreement" (for an INMARSAT) the purpose of
which:
Article III
(a) [i]s to make provision on a commercial basis for the
space segment necessary for improving communications to
ships of all nations, thereby assisting in satisfying the need
for better public correspondence facilities, in providing
radiodetermination, and in improving distress and safety
communications and efficiency and management of ships
277 IMCO Subcommittee on Radiocommunications, March 5, 1973, lth Session,
Agenda Item 4, Maritime Satellites, Provisional Principles for the Establishment of
an International Organization for a Maritime Satellite Service, Document Submitted
by the USSR Delegation, COM XI/4/10 (On file with CMS).
278 MARSAT III/WP.I, 11 Sept. 1973, First Report of the Drafting Group, Panel of
Experts on Maritime Satellites, 3d Session, Agenda Item 2. Nor was the Soviet "mili-
tary use" language found in the drafts of other collateral working groups, e.g. MAR-
SAT II/WP.6, May 3, 1973, Provisional Principles for the Establishment of an
International Organization for a Maritime Satellite System (INMARSAT) Part II, art.
2 (On file with CMS).
279 MARSAT 11/8, May 8, 1973, IMCO, Panel of Experts on Maritime Satellites,
2nd Session, Report to the Maritime Safety Committee, Annex III, Provisional Prin-
ciples for the Establishment of an International Organization for A Maritime Satel-
lite System (On file with CMS).
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(c) The Organization shall act exclusively for peaceful
purposes. 80
The U.S. "peaceful purposes" language was perpetuated
in the Draft Convention submitted by the U.S. in Septem-
ber 1975.281 By October 1975, the Conference had three
texts available for Article 3 (Purpose) of the Convention,
from the Panel of Experts, the U.S. Intersessional Working
Group (11/2), and the German, U.K., Norwegian ISWG.282
None disagreed on the "peaceful purposes" language. The
final report of the Intersessional Working Group, in De-
cember 1975, retained the "peaceful purposes" languageY 3
The final Convention On the International Maritime Satel-
lite Organization (INMARSAT), adopted by the IMCO Con-
ference in October 1976 used the "peaceful purposes"
language, in Article 3(3). s 4
The negotiating history of the Convention does not re-
veal why the Soviet's proposed language, "It should not per-
mit the military use either directly or indirectly of the
technical means which will be at its disposal," disappeared
in 1973 from any draft texts or from further discussion. It
was never included in any draft by any intersessional work-
ing group or by the Panel of Experts. The Convention's
negotiating history further reveals that the sole focus of the
INMARSAT Convention was on international commercial
shipping and that military uses were not contemplated. Per-
haps it was believed that since the Convention would apply
to commercial shipping, any discussion of military uses
280 MARSAT/CONF/5/4, Apr. 21, 1975, Note By the Government of the United
States of America, Report of the Panel of Experts, Comments and Proposals on the
Draft Convention on the INMARSAT (On file with CMS).
28, Draft Convention on the International Maritime Satellite Organization (IN-
MARSAT), Proposed Draft Texts of Instruments, Note by the Government of the
USA, ISWG 11/2, Sept. 25, 1975, IMCO Inter-Sessional Working Group on Maritime
Satellites-2d Session (On file with CMS).
282 ISWG II/INF.2, List of Articles for the Convention and the Operating Agree-
ment, Oct. 17, 1975 (On file with CMS).
283 Final Report of the ISWG on Maritime Satellites, Note by the Secretariate,
MARSAT/CONF/13, Dec. 15, 1975, IMCO International Conference on the estab-
lishment of an International Maritime Satellite System, 2d Session, 1976 (On file
with CMS).
2 MARSAT/CONF/38, Oct. 27, 1976 (On file with CMS).
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would be superfluous. That would not be surprising since
IMCO is an organization focused on commercial shipping.
However, while the INTELSAT Convention was available to
the drafters with its narrow limits on certain military serv-
ices, no discussion of it was ever publicly recorded.
It is likely the genesis of the "peaceful purposes" lan-
guage found in the 1972 Soviet Draft Principles was any one
or more of: U.N. General Assembly resolutions; the Outer
Space Treaty; or treaties dealing with the sea or Antarctica.
However, the INMARSAT travaux preparatoire does not ex-
plicitly reveal its source.
Article 3(3)'s admonition, that the organization shall act
exclusively for peaceful purposes, explicitly and unambigu-
ously imposes an obligation on INMARSAT that may be
equally applicable to other commercial communication sat-
ellite service providers under the Outer Space Treaty and
customary international law. Article 3(3), however, does
not require more of INMARSAT than is required by inter-
national law.
5. INMARSAT & COMSAT Views On Military Uses
In October 1993, the INMARSAT General Counsel's Of-
fice stated:
"[p]eaceful uses" does not necessarily mean non-military
uses. A clearer description would be non-tactical uses. In-
marsat's commissioning of SES on naval ships or other mili-
tary uses is based on receipt of an understanding by the
respective Inmarsat Party's appropriate governmental au-
thority that its use of Inmarsat space segment will be exclu-
sively for peaceful purposes. This generally encompasses
distress and safety communications and other purposes rec-
ognized by international law.2 85
INMARSAT's Counsel's Office prepared a Summary
Legal Opinion, related to Article 3(3) and commissioning
Ship Earth Stations (SESs) on warships and naval auxiliary
285 Letter from Helga Cantell, Legal Assistant, Office of the General Counsel IN-
MARSAT (Oct. 15, 1993).
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vessels, in December 1987. Their opinion may be summa-
rized, as follows: "Peaceful" suggests "something which does
not relate to armed conflict." The travaux preparatoires of
the Convention and the Convention itself offer little help.
Such language is used in several other treaties. Use of the
words in the Law of the Sea Convention has not called use
of warships on the high seas into question. In the context of
the Outer Space Treaty, one view, which seems to be the
minority view, is that peaceful means "non-military"; so any
military use is non-peaceful, even absent armed conflict.
An opposing view, not universally agreed too, which heavily
relies on the UN Charter, is that peaceful merely means
"non-aggressive."
The legal opinion states that the use of the adverb "exclu-
sively" in the Convention cannot change the essential
meaning of the term peaceful. The best approach, in the
context of the INMARSAT Convention, is to follow the ordi-
nary meaning of the words "peaceful purposes" - those
not related to armed conflict. They concluded that use of
SESs on vessels engaged in armed conflict, even if acting in
self-defense, is not a use for peaceful purposes. They said it
is not possible to distinguish, once armed conflict begins,
between various types of communications or their use
aboard warships or naval auxiliary vessels. Therefore, once
engaged in armed conflict, SES should only be used for dis-
tress, safety communications, and other purposes recog-
nized by international humanitarian law, such as aiding the
shipwrecked, sick and wounded and alerting rescue author-
ities or other ships.286
Attached to their Summary Legal Opinion was a draft of
"Procedures for Commissioning Ship Earth Stations on
Board Warships and Naval Auxiliary Vessel," requiring the
application to clearly indicate the nature of the vessel; and
a written assurance from the competent governmental au-
thority of the vessel's flag-state that the SES would be used
exclusively for peaceful purposes. Only then would an ap-
2 6 INMARSAT Office of General Counsel, Summary Legal Opinion, art. 3(3) of
the Inmarsat Convention (Dec. 23, 1987).
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plication be granted subject to the condition the SES be
used exclusively for peaceful purposes.
The matter was to be brought before the Council for
adoption of the draft procedure and Summary Legal Opin-
ion by the Director of INMARSAT.287 In March 1988, IN-
MARSAT sent a letter to all Signatories stating the policies
of the draft procedure were applicable to the commission-
ing of SESs aboard warships and naval auxiliaries. 288 NTIA
makes these "written assurances" for the U.S.
COMSAT's view is that neither installation of INMARSAT
terminals on military vehicles nor their use in peacetime is
restricted. They conclude that permissible uses during ac-
tual hostilities include use in support of actions pursuant to
U.N. resolutions and use in support of other humanitarian
purposes. COMSAT opined, in any case, that no distinction
could be made on the basis of the cargo carried. They con-
cluded that the test involves whether the vehicle is primarily
offensive in nature and whether it is actually engaged in
armed conflict. If both questions are answered affirma-
tively, then an INMARSAT terminal could not be used con-
sistent with the Convention's requirements. If the
questions were answered in the negative, then use of the
terminals would be permissible.289 COMSAT expressed the
view it was not aware of any other limitation on the use of
INMARSAT or INTELSAT by the U.S. military. 290 It is clear
that the U.S. and coalition forces use of INMARSAT services
during the Gulf War went beyond that which INMARSAT's
counsel would approve, but was well within uses considered
permissible by COMSAT's legal counsel.
287 Letter from Dr. W. Von Noorden, Legal Advisor, INMARSAT, to COMSAT
Maritime Services, Space Communications Division (Dec. 23, 1987).
288 Letter from Dr. W. Von Noorden, General Counsel, for the Director General,
to all INMARSAT Signatories (March 29, 1988).
219 Letter from Mr. Jack Hannon, Vice President Legal Affairs, COMSAT Mobile
Communications, to the Director of Combat Development, U.S. Army (Sept. 2,
1993).
-9 Letter from Neal Kilminster, Legal Counsel, COMSAT Mobile Systems, to the
U.S. Army Communications Electronics Command (Jan. 7, 1993).
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B. INTELSAT
1. Genesis
In 1962, the United States created the Communications
Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) ,291 a private for-profit cor-
poration. 92 The Act had the twin goals of quickly obtaining
the benefits of satellite communications and doing so by
creating competition. The Act established the U.S. policy of
developing a global communications satellite system re-
sponsive to public needs and national objectives that would
provide economical service to lesser developed countries,
"nondiscriminatory" access for all users and "contribute to
world peace and understanding. "293
Under the COMSAT Act, COMSAT had the responsibility
for planning, constructing, and operating the satellite sys-
tem, either alone or with other countries, and for leasing
space satellite communications channels to common carri-
ers. Two years after COMSAT's creation, the U.S. and ten
other countries entered into an Interim Agreement estab-
lishing INTELSAT.2 94 Among other things, the Interim
Agreement provided that COMSAT would temporarily op-
erate INTELSAT, until the organization got on its feet. The
members subsequently executed two additional executive
agreements establishing INTELSAT's ground rules: the De-
finitive Agreement and the Operating Agreement. The IN-
TELSAT Definitive Agreement was signed on Aug. 20, 1971
wl COMSAT, the US Signatory to the INTELSAT and INMARSAT Conventions, is
regulated by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and receives its in-
structions on how to vote on INTELSAT and INMARSAT issues from the U.S. gov-
ernment. Through a series of FCC orders in the 1980s, primarily precipitated by
other emerging satellite communications competitors, COMSAT's functions as the
U.S. Signatory and as a commercial, competitive enterprise were separated. The
FCC docket is referred too as the "COMSAT Structure Order" series. COMSATStruc-
ture Order I, 90 F.C.C.2d 1159 (1982); COMSAT Structure Order II, 97 F.C.C.2d 145
(1984).
' Communications Satellite Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-624, tit. I, § 102, 76 Stat.
419 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 701-708 (1988)).
293 Id.
-4 Alpha Lyracom Space Communications, Inc. v. COMSAT, 946 F.2d 168, 170
(2d Cir. 1991).
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and entered into force on February 12, 1973.295 The U.S. is
a Party to the INTELSAT Agreement. 96 COMSAT is the
United States Signatory to the INTELSAT Agreement.
2. Structure and Relationships
INTELSAT is very much like INMARSAT in its structure.
It is a profit seeking297 commercial enterprise with a juridi-
cal personality, 298 comprised of an Assembly, a Board of
Governors, an executive organ, and a Meeting of Signato-
ries.299 Each Signatory has an investment share calculated
pursuant to Articles 6 and 7 of the Operating Agreement in
proportion to its utilization of INTELSAT space segment.300
Voting, like voting in INMARSAT, is generally weighted in
accordance with the Signatory's investment share.0 1
The Assembly, which meets about once every two years,
sets policy and long term plans. The twenty-eight member
Board of Governors meets about five times per year to make
decisions concerning the design, development, operation
and maintenance of the satellites. Members of the Board
represent countries or groups of countries with large own-
ership percentages.0 2 INTELSAT's daily operations are
conducted by the Director General, INTELSAT's executive
organ.
295 Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organ-
ization (INTELSAT), Feb. 12, 1973, 15 U.S.T. 1705 [hereinafter Definitive
Agreement].
-6 It should be noted that, in so far as it applies to the United States, the INTEL-
SAT Agreements are binding on the U.S. as "presidential executive agreements"
since neither were executed with the "advice and consent" of the U.S. Senate as is
required for a formal "treaty" obligation. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2.
297 Definitive Agreement, supra note 295, at art. III.
21 Id. at art. IV.
- Id. at art. VI.
-o Id. at art. V.
30, COMSAT holds roughly a 25% investment share in INTELSAT and controls
over 25% of INTELSAT's satellites. DCA Draft, supra note 33, at 5-7.
02 Martin, supra note 33, at 83.
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3. Purpose
INTELSAT's main purpose is "to continue.., the design,
development, construction, establishment, operation and
maintenance of the space segment of the global commer-
cial telecommunications satellite system as established
under the . . .Interim Agreement and the Special Agree-
ment."30 3 Like INMARSAT, it owns its satellites, but each
member owns its earth terminals.0 4
In the Preamble of its Definitive Agreement, INTELSAT
recognizes the principles of UNGA Resolution 1721 (XVI),
the Outer Space Treaty, that outer space shall be used "for
the benefit of all mankind" and that outer space "shall be
used for the benefit and in the interests of all countries. 30 5
Unlike the later-developed INMARSAT Convention, it does
not explicitly refer to the UN Charter or the applicability of
international law. Nor does it state that it will act for
"peaceful purposes," exclusively or otherwise.
Unlike INMARSAT, INTELSAT's Definitive Agreement
specifically refers to "military" use by stating:
Article III
(d) The INTELSAT space segment may also, on request,
and under appropriate terms and conditions, be utilized for
the purposes of specialized telecommunications services,
either international or domestic, other than for military
purposes ....
(e) INTELSAT may, on request and under appropriate con-
ditions, provide satellites or associated facilities separate
from the INTELSAT space segment for:
(iii) specialized telecommunications services, other than for
military purposes; ....
Article I(1) defines "specialized telecommunications serv-
ices" as:
os Definitive Agreement, supra note 295, at art. II(a).
- Martin, supra note 33, at 83.
so Definitive Agreement, supra note 295, preamble.
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(1) [T]elecommunications services which can be provided by
satellite, other than those (services) defined in paragraph
(k) of this Article (Public telecommunications services), in-
cluding but not limited to, radio navigation services, broad-
casting satellite services for reception by the general public,
space research services, meteorological services, and earth
resources services;
(k) "Public telecommunications services" means fixed or
mobile telecommunications services which can be provided
by satellite and which are available for use by the public...
between approved earth stations .. .having access to IN-
TELSAT ...and leased circuits ...but excluding those
mobile services not provided under the Interim Agreement
and the Special Agreement prior to the opening for signa-
ture of this Agreement, which are provided through mobile
stations operating directly to a satellite which is designed, in
whole or in part, to provide services relating to the safety or
flight control of aircraft or to aviation or maritime radio
navigation.
The Agreement does not define the term "public." How-
ever, it does specifically use the terms "user(s)," "State,"
"Government(s)," "peoples," "mankind" and "military" sep-
arately and distinctively. Generally, public means "open to
all. ' 30 6 Does public include or exclude the military? The
answer may lie in the apparent genesis of the Definitive
Agreement's "military purposes" proscriptions.3 °
The Article III (d) and (e) military purpose proscription
found its way into the Definitive Agreement through a pro-
posal made by Algeria, in the 1969 Preparatory Committee
of the Plenipotentiary Conference, and was included in the
draft agreements attached to the Preparatory Committee's
Revised Draft Report of October 3, 1969 and Final Report
of December 11, 1969. The Algerian language was ulti-
mately included in the final text of the Definitive Agree-
- THE OXFORD ENGLISH DIcrIoNARY 778 (2d ed. 1989).
07 The views of INTELSAT, COMSAT and the U.S. Military are contained in sub-
sequent sections of this paper. Their interpretations would not exclude the military
from the "public."
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ment.308  The Algerian's remarks, contained in the
Summary Record of the March 3, 1969, First Session of the
Plenipotentiary Conference, may reveal the intent of the
clause. "While noting that his delegation would not object
to a country using channels in a regular INTELSAT satellite
for security purposes, he regarded the provision by INTEL-
SAT of separate satellites for military needs as contrary to
the Preamble of the Interim Agreement." 0
It is worth reiterating that even the Algerian proponents
of the "military purpose" language did not object to uses of
"regular INTELSAT satellite(s)" for security purposes.
So, INTELSAT is proscribed from providing "specialized
telecommunications services" for military purposes. It may
and does provide "public telecommunications services" to
DoD and other Defense Ministries for military purposes.
4. INTELSAT & COMSAT Views Concerning Military Uses
INTELSAT's Office of General Counsel stated that "the
publicly available literature concerning the negotiating his-
tory of the INTELSAT Agreements with respect to the
prohibitions in Article III ... [makes] no mention of these
provisions. ' 310 The Counsel's Office pointed out that the
express proscription did not apply to using INTELSAT
space segment to provide "public telecommunications serv-
ices." Likewise, COMSAT World System Division's view is
that "there is nothing in the INTELSAT Agreement that
prohibits or discourages the use of INTELSAT for either
U.S. national security or intelligence purposes .... [T]he
U.S. Department of Defense, Department of State and
NASA have been users of the INTELSAT system from its
-8 Memorandum for Commander, Naval Telecommunications Services under the
INTELSAT Agreement, from Department of the Navy, Office of the Judge Advocate
General, Deputy Assistant JAG (International Law).
a- JONATHAN F. GALLOWAY, THE POLITIcs AND TECHNOLOGY OF SATELLITE COMMU-
NICATION 162 (1972).
31o Letter from David B. Meltzer, Senior Attorney, INTELSAT Office of General
Counsel (Oct. 25, 1993).
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advent . . . ,"311 INTELSAT apparently does not provide
any "specialized telecommunications services," which would
require equipping satellites with special hardware, to any-
one at the present time and thus, there appears to be no
issue concerning military use of its satellite system. 12
C. MILITARY USE OF INTELSAT & INMARSAT-U.S.
MILITARY VIEW
The Defense Communications Agency (DCA), now the
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), DoD's long-
haul telecommunications company, has the view that noth-
ing in the INTELSAT Agreement precludes the military use
of INTELSAT.313 It does recognize the "specialized serv-
ices" restriction. DCA concluded that all currently offered
INTELSAT services are "public telecommunications serv-
ices" available to the military forces of any Signatory state. 4
The DCA said that the "peaceful purposes" clause of the
INMARSAT Convention "could be interpreted to prohibit
military tactical use of the system for combat operations. It
has not been interpreted to preclude military administra-
tive and support use."315 More recently, DISA reiterated IN-
MARSAT General Counsel's interpretation, but concluded
that the broader interpretation by COMSAT and the mili-
tary services was allowable under the Convention.1
The Judge Advocate General (JAG), U.S. Navy (USN),
concluded that USN units may use INMARSAT in support
of armed conflict under the auspices of U.N. resolutions,
31n Letter from Warren Y. Zeger, COMSAT World Systems Division, to the Office
of General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency (Feb. 3, 1989) (contained in DCA
Draft, supra note 33, at A-4).
312 Id.
313 DCA Draft, supra note 33, at 5-4.
314 Id.
315 Id.
"16 Memorandum by the Office of the Chief Regulatory Counsel for the Special
Assistant, Satellite Communications, Office of The Assistant Secretary of Defense
(C31) (Mar. 27, 1992). The Memorandum noted that, as of Mar. 15, 1992, the fol-
lowing INMARSAT terminals, were operating, under a 10-year DoD contract with
COMSAT: Air Force-10; DISA-15; Military Sealift Command-i10; Navy-56 (20
planned); Army-160; Marine Corps-30; Ready Reserves-96.
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such as those which authorized the use of "all necessary
means" to uphold and implement all previous United Na-
tions Security Council resolutions. 317 The U.S. Department
of State, in its written coordination of the USN JAG opin-
ion,31 8 stated:
The Convention does not define "peaceful purposes," and
its negotiating history does not suggest a specific meaning.
Under such circumstances, the term... should be given the
meaning that it has been accorded under the law relating to
space activities. Under such a reading, "peaceful purposes"
does not exclude military activities so long as those activities
are consistent with the United Nations Charter. This inter-
pretation is supported by subsequent practice, under which
INMARSAT has long approved the installation of SESs
aboard warships ... [the INMARSAT] December 1987 legal
opinion .. .did not consider the effect of U.N. Security
Council Resolutions ....
The U.S. State Department responded to the concerns
expressed by INMARSAT's Director General, in 1991, over
the publicity given the military use of INMARSAT during
the Gulf War and suggested to DoD that any planned IN-
MARSAT usage beyond that in support of U.N. resolutions
must be consistent with U.S. treaty obligations, under the
INMARSAT Convention. 319 The INMARSAT Director Gen-
eral's letter seems to suggest that INMARSAT may not agree
with the U.S. interpretation concerning military use of IN-
MARSAT capacity in support of U.N. resolutions.
The Navy has also determined that SESs may be installed
and used on warships "to support all the normal functions
of a warship, including the legitimate use of force in self-
defense [such as] military exercises to maintain readiness,
51 Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations by the Deputy AssistantJudge
Advocate General (International Law) (Jan. 14, 1991).
518 Attachment to the Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations by the
Deputy AssistantJudge Advocate General (International Law) (Jan. 14, 1991).
319 Exchange of Letters Between INMARSAT's Director General, the Bureau of
International Communications and Information Policy-US Department of State, and
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Defense-wide C3I) (Jan. 25, 1991, Feb.
11, 1991, andJune 4, 1991).
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or legitimate uses of force to counter aggression."3 2 0 Their
opinion appeared to adopt the definition that "peaceful
purposes" means non-aggressive purposes, not non-military
purposes. The U.S. Navy JAG has also expressed the opin-
ion that the explicit "military purpose" limitations of Article
III, INTELSAT Definitive Agreement, do not apply to pub-
lic telecommunications services, which may therefore be
utilized by the Navy.3 21
PART III. APPLICATION OF THE OUTER SPACE
TREATY
A. STATE & INTELSAT/INMARSAT RESPONSIBLITY
Much has been written about the origins and meaning of
the concept of using outer space, the Moon and other ce-
lestial bodies for "peaceful purposes" referred to in the
Outer Space Treaty and various United Nations General As-
sembly resolutions. There is little question that the provi-
sions of the Outer Space Treaty apply to states that are
parties to the Treaty and, by now, many would seem to
agree that the principles found in the Outer Space Treaty,
the Magna Carta of space law, have become recognized ele-
ments of customary international law applicable to all na-
tions. It is likewise clear that states bear responsibility for
the outer space activities of their commercial communica-
tions satellite operators and must ensure their activities con-
form to the Outer Space Treaty.3 22
Although there may still be some debate, in spite of the
rather unambiguous language of Article VI, over the re-
sponsibility of international organizations for such activi-
ties, 23 it appears that the concept has been accepted, if not
120 Memorandum from OPJAG Code 102 (Head, LOS Branch) to OP-605, Use of
INMARSAT System on Warships (Aug. 27, 1987).
521 Memorandum for Commander, Naval Telecommunications Services under the
INTELSAT Agreement, from Department of the Navy, Office of the Judge Advocate
General, Deputy Assistant JAG (International Law).
522 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 12, art. VI.
525 See, e.g.,J.E.S. FAWCETr, OUTER SPACE, NEW CHALLENGES TO LAW AND POLICY 29
(1984) (arguing that article VI of the Outer Space Treaty is merely a "policy direc-
tive rather than a rule of law" because not all international organizations have legal
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exercised. 24 Article VI states, in pertinent part: "[W] hen ac-
tivities are carried on in outer space, including the moon
and other celestial bodies by an international organization,
responsibility for compliance with this Treaty shall be borne
both by the international organization and by the States
Parties to the Treaty participating in such organization." 25
I believe that States do have responsibility for the outer
space activities of international organizations, such as IN-
TELSAT, INMARSAT, regional satellite communication or-
ganizations, the United Nations and regional security
organizations, such as NATO. Such a conclusion is sup-
ported by the fact that INTELSAT and INMARSAT both
have juridical personalities and their Conventions indicate
a commitment to adhere to the Outer Space Treaty and
UNGA Resolution 1721 (XVI) in their Preambles. 26
Both the Outer Space Treaty and UNGA Resolution 1721
(XVI) state that "international law" and the U.N. Charter
apply to outer space and activities in outer space. I must
therefore conclude that the provisions of international law,
personality, and legal obligations may not be imposed, even on an organization with
juridical personality, via an external treaty to which it has not assented).
324 At least the U.S. State Department recognized the U.S. obligations under the
law of outer space in relation to INMARSAT use issues, as I pointed out earlier.
Most opinions I have examined, however, concerning INMARSAT or INTELSAT use
by the military do not go beyond the Conventions pertaining to those organizations
themselves, the United Nations Charter and perhaps the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties. Likewise, they do not address the fact that the Outer Space Treaty
and UNGA Resolution 1721 (XVI) are referred to in the Preamble of both Conven-
tions and what impact, if any, that might have.
3- Outer Space Treaty, supra note 12, at art. XIII (reiterating this responsibility by
providing that the Treaty applies to State activities even if carried out by interna-
tional governmental organizations).
326 The issue concerning INTELSAT or INMARSAT's legal capacity to sign inter-
national agreements, such as the UN Charter or the treaties relating to outer space,
must be left for examination on another day.
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the Outer Space Treaty 27 and the U.N. Charter 28 apply to
INTELSAT and INMARSAT and their activities in space.329
B. APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLE IV's-"PEACEFUL PURPOSES"
TO "OUTER SPACE"
If INMARSAT and INTELSAT have responsibility for
their activities in outer space and States have responsibili-
ties for the outer space activities of international organiza-
tions to which they belong as well as for the outer space
activities of commercial communications satellite providers,
the question remains what exactly are the obligations of sat-
ellite communications providers concerning the use of
outer space for "peaceful purposes"?
Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty states:
(1) States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in
orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weap-
ons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, in-
stall such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such
weapons in outer space in any other manner.
(2) The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all
States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful pur-
poses. The establishment of military bases, installations, and
fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the
conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be
forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific re-
search or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be pro-
hibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for
327 See also Istvan Herczeg, Problems of Interpretation of the Space Treaty of Jan.
27, 1967, Proceedings of the Tenth Colloquium On the Law of Outer Space, Sept.
24-29, 1967, at 111.
328 U.N. Charter, supra note 27, at art. 103 (stating that in the event of a conflict
between an obligation, under the Charter, and another international agreement to
which a State is a party, the Charter provision prevails). I believe that U.S. obliga-
tions, under the INTELSAT Definitive Agreement, even though merely an "execu-
tive agreement" for the U.S., are subject to Article 103.
3 The INMARSAT Convention provides that it shall observe the International
Telecommunications Union(ITU) Convention, "take into account" the "regulatory
law" of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and Internationai Civil Avia-
tion Organization (ICAO) and "shall cooperate with the United Nations" and its
Specialized Agencies.
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peaceful exploration of the moon or other celestial bodies
shall also not be prohibited.2330
These two clauses, and others related to the issue of "peace-
ful purposes," have been carefully scrutinized since the
words were first embodied in the Treaty. There are gener-
ally two theories concerning the applicability of the "peace-
ful purposes" language to outer space. The first theory is a
narrow, strict interpretation of the Treaty that concludes
the clause is not applicable to "outer space."'33 1 The second
theory is a broader interpretation of the Treaty, looking at
other pertinent clauses, referenced U.N. General Assembly
resolutions, the U.N. Charter, and international law, that
concludes that all "outer space" must be used for "peaceful
purposes."332
If the clause does not apply to outer space, any discussion
of its direct applicability to INTELSAT and INMARSAT
ends because neither organization conducts activities on
-10 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 12, at art. IV. I added the numbering to the
clauses for ease of reference.
- Authors, such as Zhukov, Kolosov, Fawcett, Bridge, Prof. Dembling, Reed and
Norris, hold such a view. See GENNADY ZHUKOV & YUI KOLOSOV, INTERNATIONAL
SPACE LAw 57 (1984) wherein they recognize that the Outer Space Treaty requires
"total neutralization and demilitarization of celestial bodies and (only) partial demil-
itarization of outer space." See alsoJ.E.S. FAWCETr, OUTER SPACE, NEW CHALLENGES
TO LAW AND PoLIcY 15 (1984). The author states that "there is no provision that
outer space shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes." Id. Fawcett concludes
tactical and strategic uses of outer space by the military (for attack warning, surveil-
lance, communications, intelligence, and meteorology) are not proscribed by Art.
IV. See also Robert L. Bridge, International Law and Military Activities In Outer Space, 13
AKRON L. REv. 649 (1979); Reed & Norris, supra note 4, at 676 (quoting an article by
the former General Counsel of NASA, Prof. Dembling, The Evolution of the Outer
Space Treaty, 33J. OF AIR L. & COM. 419, 433-34 (1967)); G.C.M. Reijnen, The Term
"Peaceful" In Space Law, Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Colloquium On the Law of
Outer Space, Sept. 27, 1982, at 147; DADoMAR WADEGAONKAR, THE ORBIT OF SPACE
LAw 13 (1984).
332 Bridge, supra note 331, at 658 (citing S. HOusTON LAY & HoWARD J.
TAUBENFELD, THE LAW RELATING TO ACrIVITIES OF MAN IN OUTER SPACE 97 n.3
(1970)); see also Walter D. Reed & Robert W. Norris, supra note 331, at 676 (quoting
an article by the former General Counsel of NASA, Prof. Dembling, The Evolution of
the Outer Space Treaty, 33J. OF AIR L. & COM. 419, 434 (1967)). Professor Dembling
stated (irrespective of Article IV), "any military use of outer space must be restricted
to nonaggressive purposes in view of Article III, which makes applicable interna-
tional law including the Charter of the United Nations." See J.N. SINGH, OUTER
SPACE, OUTER SEA, OUTER LAND, AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 86 (1987).
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the moon or other celestial bodies.333 The subscribers to
the first theory rely on a fundamental axiom of interna-
tional law,334 that "if an act is not specifically prohibited,
then international law permits it."335 Under this theory,
which seems to be the view most widely held, several states
and scholars have expressed their view that since the words
of section (2) specifically apply only to "the moon and
other celestial bodies," there is no issue as to their applica-
bility to "outer space"; the clause is simply not applicable to
outer space.
This first school of thought also notes that had the
Treaty's authors wished to apply the limitation to "outer
space," they would have specifically done so as they did with
specific limitations concerning military bases, installations,
fortifications, military maneuvers, and use of military per-
sonnel. 33 6 They accurately note that the Treaty's authors
specifically used the words "outer space including the
moon and other celestial bodies" in other articles when
they wanted a provision to apply to outer space, but not in
Article IV. Since military uses were in outer space and not
on the moon or celestial bodies and were the overwhelm-
ingly predominant uses at the time the Treaty was signed
and ratified, they logically reason that the authors merely
recognized and did not purport to proscribe a very obvious
and accepted practice.337
33 This is not to say that neither will never consider such activities.
31 Vlasic, supra note 16, at 51 n.32. Dr. V. Vereshchetim, a leading Soviet com-
mentator, wrote that such a theory "contradicts the general principles of interna-
tional law, trends in the legal regulation of activities of this type, the world's sense of
legality and international norms." V. VERESHCHETIN, PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE,
111 (1986).
"5 Bridge, supra note 331, at 664.
336 JASENTULIYANA & LEE, supra note 234. They observe that "during the debate on
the Outer Space Treaty in the General Assembly several delegations questioned the
propriety of excluding outer space from the coverage of the second part of Article
IV because to do so would create the implication that outer space may be used for
non-peaceful purposes." Reed & Norris, supra note 4, at 676.
-17 See also Reed & Norris, supra note 4, at 676 (quoting an article by the former
General Counsel of NASA, Prof. Dembling. Professor Dembling noted that the
drafters sought a "practical solution" in light of the pre-existing military space activi-
ties of both the U.S. and U.S.S.R.).
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The second theory attempts to define the clause by refer-
ence to other clauses in the Treaty and looks at the clause
in the context of other international law. It looks to: (1)
the Outer Space Treaty's Preamble;338 (2) the language of
the other articles of the Outer Space Treaty;3 9 and, (3)
other sources of international law, such as U.N. General As-
sembly resolutions and the U.N. Charter.340
s The Preamble recognizes:
(a) "the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the explora-
tion and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,"
(b) the belief that "the exploration and use of outer space should be
for the benefit of all peoples..."
(c) the "desire to contribute to broad international cooperation in the...
use of outer space for peaceful purposes;".
(d) that the Treaty will "further the Purposes and Principles of the Char-
ter of the United Nations;"
(e) UNGA Resolutions 1962 (XVIII), 1884 (XVIII), and 110 (II).
's9 (a) Article I. "The... use of outer space, including the moon and other celes-
tial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries... and
shall be the province of all mankind'; "Outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, shall be free for ... use by all States ... in accordance with interna-
tional law . . . ";
(b) Article III. "States ... shall carry on activities in the .. . use of outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law,
including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international
peace and security and promoting international cooperation and understanding";
(c) Article IX. "In the . . . use of outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, States Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle of coopera-
tion and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their activities in outer space, includ-
ing the moon and other celestial bodies, with due regard to the corresponding interests
of other States Parties to the Treaty."
30 (a) Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1962, U.N. GAOR, 18th Sess. (1963). This resolu-
tion recognized the "common interest of all mankind in the. .use of outer space for
peaceful purposes," and declared that the "exploration and use of outerspace shall
be carried on for the benefit and in the interests of all mankind ... in accordance
with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest
of maintaining international peace and security . ... "
(b) Question of General and Complete Disarmament, G.A. Res. 1884, U.N. GAOR, 18th
Sess. (1962). This resolution welcomed the USSR-US agreement not to station nu-
clear weapons or weapons of mass destruction in outer space.
(c) G.A. Res. 110, U.N. GAOR, Annex 2 (1947). This resolution dealt with con-
demnation of propaganda from outer space.
(d) The Law of the Sea Conventions of 1982. This Convention, not yet entered into
force, discusses "peaceful uses" of the seas.
(e) The Antarctica Treaty, June 23, 1961, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T. 71. This
treaty proscribed "any measures of a military nature" on the continent, but not the
use of military personnel for peaceful purposes.
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This second school of thought concludes that the lan-
guage, "common interest of all mankind," the "benefit of
all peoples,"3 41 "broad international cooperation," "further-
ing the purposes of the U.N.," "use in accordance with in-
ternational law," "maintaining peace and security,"
"promoting international cooperation" and "having regard
for the interests of other States," found in the Outer Space
Treaty are principles which serve to define what uses may
be made of outer space. As such, they also serve to define
the meaning and applicability of the clause "peaceful
purposes."34
2
In other words, under the second theory, outer space
must be used in a positive, broadly cooperative way for the
benefit of all peoples and mankind, following international
law, taking into the account the interests of other States and
in a manner which does not jeopardize international peace
and security. Further refining this definition are the re-
quirements, found in the U.N. Charter and U.N. General
Assembly resolutions,343 that the threat or use of armed
(f) The U.N. Charter, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, entered into force Oct. 24,
1945. This document states the resolve that in order to "live together in peace," we
must ensure "armed forces shall not be used, save in the common interest." It also
states the UN's purpose to "maintain international peace... suppress acts of aggres-
sion or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in
conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settle-
ment of international disputes or situations" and to "settle their international dis-
putes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security,
and justice, are not endangered" and to "refrain ... from the threat or use of force
... inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations" and "to only use force for
self-defense."
(g) G.A. Res. 1348, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess. (1958). This resolution recognized
the common aim of humankind that outer space be used "for peaceful purposes
only."
(h) G.A. Res. 1721, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess. (1961). This resolution provides that
outer space "may be used for peaceful purposes."
341 Marcoff, Disarmament and "Peaceful Purposes" Provisions In the 1967 Outer Space
Treaty, 4J. SPACE L. 3, 11 (1976) (citing Reed & Norris, supra note 4, at 680. Reed
and Norris criticize Marcoff's theory that Art. I's "benefit of all countries" language
excludes all military uses.
32 See generally J.N. SINCH, supra note 332, at 80. See also Gennady M. Danilenko,
The Progressive Development of Space Law: New Opportunities and Restraints, SPACE LAW:
VIEWS OF THE FUTURE 109 (1988); Herczeg, supra note 327, at 106.
4-1 I acknowledge the considerable debate concerning the international legal ef-
fect, if any, of U.N. resolutions. See, e.g., Bridge, supra note 331, at 650, 663-64. See
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force may only be used in the common interest or for self-
defense. This second interpretation seems more generally
appealing because it addresses the almost universal aspira-
tion that outer space be utilized for "peaceful purposes."
C. THE MEANING OF "PEACEFUL PURPOSES"
1. Various Interpretations
Once again, there are some interpretations of the "peace-
ful purposes" clause, several of which have already been
mentioned. The term "peaceful" can be found in virtually
all U.N. documents devoted to outer space matters. 344 Most
experts agree, however, that the Outer Space Treaty does
not prohibit "military use" of space.345 There has been a
"consensus, within the United Nations that 'peaceful' more
spcifically equates to 'nonaggressive.' ' 46 The principal
space powers have "tacitly agreed" that all military activities
in outer space are permissible unless specifically prohib-
ited.34 ' Such interpretations make the deployment of mili-
tary satellites permissible. 348 Both the U.S. and former
Soviet Union have offered "tangible evidence of their sup-
port for using the space environment for peaceful
purposes. 349
also OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY & PRACTICE, 178 Rec. des
Cours 111-121 (1982-V), cited in BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW at 114-121 (1991).
-4 Vlasic, supra note 16, at 37.
- Id. at 47 n.20. Apparently, Professor S. Gorove believed, as of 1988, that there
were essentially only two competing definitions of "peaceful purposes:" one being
.nonmilitary" and the other "nonaggressive." BHUPENDRAJASANI, PEACEFUL AND NON-
PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE, PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION FOR THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS
RACE 7 (1991). In most multilateral treaties, in which the terms "peaceful activities"
are used, it is interpreted to mean "non-military." Some emerging space powers sug-
gest "peaceful" should mean total absence of the military and or conflict. G.C.M.
Reijnen, The Term "Peaceful" In Space Law, Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Collo-
quium On the Law of Outer Space, Sept. 27, 1982, at 146.
346 Reed & Norris, supra note 4, at 678. They point out that neither the U.N.
Charter nor international law prohibit nonaggressive military activities. Conse-
quently they are permissible. See also CA. Q. CHRISTOL, SPACE LAW, PAST, PRESENT,
AND FUTURE 16 (1991).
347 Vlasic, supra note 16, at 38.
- JAsAN, supra note 345, at 16.
349 CHRISTOL, supra note 356, at 15. See infra note 378.
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The original Soviet view was that "peaceful purposes"
meant no "military" use of outer space, a view that they later
softened 350 as their military satellite programs came to frui-
tion.3 5 1 The Soviets have always claimed that their uses of
outer space were "peaceful" and "scientific."352 The U.S.
view has always been3 5 3 that the phrase "peaceful purposes"
means no "aggressive "354 use of outer space, a view it has
adhered to from the beginning of the space age.355 The
problem with the US interpretation is that it merely substi-
tutes the problems of interpretation of "peaceful" to the
word "non-aggressive." 356 The benefit of such a definition
3 o Vlasic, supra note 16, at 40. Vlasic states that Soviet scholars have never devi-
ated from this position.
'5, Bridge, supra note 331, at 658.
352 Reed & Norris, supra note 4, at 679.
3 Vlasic, supra note 16, at 40. Vlasic would disagree. It is his belief that the later
U.S. reliance on the "nonaggressive" use definition was a change from its earlier
espousal of "peaceful" uses.
-54 Such a view would be in accord with the requirements of the U.N. Charter in
that the Charter's limitations on the threat or use of force have no "spatial" limits.
See GENNADY ZHUKOV AND Yumi KOLOSOV, INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAw 51 (1984).
3-5 The U.S. has historically and consistently argued that "peaceful" means "non-
aggressive." Bridge, supra note 331, at 658. National Aeronautics and Space Act of
1958, 42 U.S.C. § 2451(a) (1988). This statute established U.S. policy, "[T]he Con-
gress hereby declares that it is the policy of the United States that activities in space
shall be devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind." In addressing
Congress on the establishment of NASA, President Eisenhower emphasized the
"concern of our Nation that outer space be devoted to peaceful and scientific pur-
poses." Reed & Norris, supra note 4, at 674. Reed & Norris also refer to the May 11,
1978, Presidential Directive, which established U.S. space policies, wherein Presi-
dent Carter stated the U.S., "is committed to the exploration of outer space for
peaceful purposes and the benefit of all mankind ...." The Directive also provided
the U.S. will use space for self-defense, and to support certain military uses. The
Commercial Space Launch Act, .49 U.S.C. § 2601(1) (1988). This statute provides
that "peaceful uses of outer space continue to be of great value and to offer benefits
to mankind."
356 Does "aggressive" mean "use of armed force?" Does the purpose or intent be-
hind the use of armed force define "aggressive?" May armed force be used in a "non-
aggressive" manner? Does "non-aggressive" merely mean "peaceful purposes?" In
fact, the Outer Space Treaty, specifically Art. IV, expressly prohibits some activities
which would not be considered "aggressive," such as the establishment of military
installations or weapons testing. See Bridge, supra note 331, at 659. "Aggression is
the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or polit-
ical independence of another State or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this definition." G.A. Res. 3314 U.N.
GAOR, 29th Sess. Supp. No. 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975), set forth in Reed &
Norris, supra note 4, at 682. This definition sounds remarkably similar to that of
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is that it appears to somewhat parallel the interpretation of
the terms "aggression" and "peace" found in the U.N. Char-
ter. 57 The U.S. definition, which has not explicitly adopted
the definition of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3314, is
overly restrictive. There are times when "aggression" is per-
missible (e.g., for the common interest, peace-keeping or
enforcement or individual or collective self-defense).
2. Selected Terms
Many years ago, one scholar noted the words "peaceful
purpose" must be distinguished from the words "peaceful
use." She was criticized for having made a meaningless dis-
tinction. 58 It appears, however, that the use of the word
"purpose" in Article IV "brings in the notions of both intent
and of consequences; the activity must not be designed to
terminate in some use of force contrary to international
law." 3 59 There is no indication that the Outer Space Treaty
drafters intended the term "purpose" to have any "special
meaning." Thus, whether or not a "use" was peaceful de-
pends on its "purpose."360
Other authors have argued over whether the use of the
adjective "exclusively" in Article IV (e.g., shall be "used ex-
"peaceful purposes." In fact, Reed & Norris point out that it "incorporates all the
uncertainties and ambiguities of the U.N. Charter, in addition to adding a few of its
own." Reed & Norris, supra note 4, at 682.
557 Essentially, nations have agreed in the Charter to act "peacefully," a term
which the Charter then elaborates with specific examples, e.g., suppression of acts of
aggression, no threats or use of force, save in the common interest or for (legiti-
mate) self-defense.
358 BRUCE A. HURWITZ, THE LEGALITY OF SPACE MILITARIZATION 58, n.20 (1986).
See also Eilene Galloway, International Institutions to Ensure Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 310 (1984).
359 J.E.S. FAWCETr, OUTER SPACE, NEw CHALLENGES TO LAW AND POLICY 109
(1984). See also JEROME MORENOFF, WORLD PEACE THROUGH SPACE LAw 296 (1973),
wherein the author examines the legality of the U.S. use of reconnaissance satellites
in light of its "intent." He notes that such use could become allowable (and it has),
whether it is a military or non-military activity, if there is a "rightful intent."
-o Isabelle Sourbes & Yves Boyer, Technical Aspects of Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses
of Space, in PEACEFUL AND NoN-PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE, PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION FOR
THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE 65 (1991).
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clusively for peaceful purposes") is meaningful.3 61  The
term is not used in the U.N. Charter, the Antarctica Treaty,
or most U.N. General Assembly resolutions applicable to
space. "Exclusive" means, among other things, "limited to
that which is designated." 362 The word first appeared in
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1148 in Nov. 14, 1957,
which incorporated a proposal to develop an inspection sys-
tem to ensure objects launched into space would be "exclu-
sively for peaceful and scientific purposes. '363 Later, U.N.
General Assembly Resolution 1348 (1958) recognized that
the common aim of humankind was that outer space was to
be used "for peaceful purposes only. '364 The term "exclu-
sive" merely emphasizes that outer space is to be used solely
for "peaceful purposes."
In light of the object and purpose of the Outer Space
Treaty, the term "purpose" should be given its "ordinary
meaning" according to the rules of treaty construction set
forth in the Vienna Convention, discussed below. "Pur-
pose" is generally defined as "an intended or desired result;
end, aim; goal. 3 65 Subsequent State practice appears to
confirm that "use" is to be distinguished from "purpose."
Take, for example, the "Star Wars" program which never
came to fruition. Although arguably "non-peaceful" or "ag-
gressive" uses might have been made of space, the stated
purpose of the program was to defend the U.S., a peaceful
"purpose" self-defense. 66 Therefore, the drafters very de-
liberately distinguished "use" from "purpose" and inten-
tionally chose the latter. As a result, through the use of the
-' INMARSAT's General Counsel takes the view that the term "exclusive" adds no
meaning to the clause in the INMARSAT Convention. See also Reijnen, supra note
345, at 148.
62 THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 461 (1980).
363 Vlasic, sura note 16, at 38.
- Id. at 39.
- THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DIcrIONARY 1074 (1980).
- There is a debate whether the use of outer space for "self-defense" constitutes a
peaceful purpose." The U.S. view, articulated by the State Department and various
DoD organizations, mentioned above, is that such a use is for a "peaceful purpose."
INMARSAT's General Counsel's view, referred to above, would appear to be that
such use would not fall within the definition of "peaceful purposes."
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term "purpose," the drafters of the Outer Space Treaty in-
corporated a "rightful intent" test.36
7
3. Self-Defense
There has been considerable debate concerning the ex-
tent to which "self-defense" may exist and still be consid-
ered "peaceful." Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which
permits individual or collective self-defense in the event of
an "armed attack," is an exception to the Charter's princi-
ple that U.N. members will refrain from the use or threat of
the use of armed force against another State.
The definitions of "self-defense" run "the gamut from an
innate natural right of self-preservation, afforded by the
doctrine of necessity, to that highly restricted response re-
sulting from an instant overwhelming necessity leaving no
choice of means and no moment for deliberation."368 Self-
defense today must be looked at as a broader concept that
"develope(d) as the sophistication of our society has in-
creased.369 Many believe a pre-Charter norm of customary
international law persists which does not require an armed
attack as a perquisite to legitimate self-defense. 7 ° Most be-
lieve that there is a right to "anticipatory" self-defense, 71
"particularly in this age of weapons that have the capability
to inflict awesome destruction within minutes of the
launching of an attack."37 2 Others believe that an armed at-
tack must be imminent in order to justify the use of armed
force in self-defense. 73 This latter view is myopic. As for-
37 See FAWCETr, supra note 359 and accompanying text.
- JEROME MORENOFF, WORLD PEACE THROUGH SPACE LAW 220 (1973).
-6 Id. at 221.
-0 Edith Weiss, Lecture on the Use of Force & Arms Control, Georgetown Univer-
sity Law School (Nov. 9, 1992). See Louis HENKIN, USE OF FORCE: LAW AND U.S.
POLICY, RIGHT V. MIGHT 37-69 (1989). See also MYRs S. McDouGAL & FLORENTrRA P.
FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER-THE LEGAL REGULATION OF IN-
TERNATIONAL COERCION 232-240 (1961).
57' IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 362
(1963), n.16. (noting that Article 51 itself states that, "Nothing in the present Char-
ter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense ..
372 Bridge, supra note 331, at 660.
373 Reed & Norris, supra note 4, at 683.
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mer U.S. President Kennedy said in reference to nuclear
weapons, "[w] e no longer live in a world where only the ac-
tual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a
nation's security to constitute maximum peril ...."3 Main-
taining international peace and security today requires na-
tions to anticipate threats. Self-defense has two basic legal
requirements, both of which must meet the test of reasona-
bleness: necessity and proportionality.3 75 Although the U.S.
may not face the threat of imminent armed attack from
Iraq, the use of communications satellites in the process of
monitoring Iraq's military readiness, however, is reason-
able, necessary and in proportion to the threat posed by
Iraq. The "necessity" test would be met by the fact that con-
trol over potential aggressive acts by Iraq is needed to se-
cure the preservation of states threatened by it. The use of
the satellites would reduce the danger, thus legitimizing a
claim of anticipatory self-defense. 76
The U.S. has continuously invoked the right of self-de-
fense to justify reconnaissance overflights.37 7 Use of recon-
naissance satellites has become an accepted practice and is
considered a use of space for "peaceful purposes."378 The
purpose behind military use of commercial communica-
tions satellites differs only to a small degree.
Whatever definition one gives to the concept of "self-de-
fense," the ultimate test of whether an action is legitimate
self-defense is the approval of the U.N. Security Council
rather than the opinion of each individual nation asserting
such a right.3 79 It should be kept in mind that neither the
U.N. nor the vast majority of its member States have pro-
tested most unilateral efforts of the U.S. to maintain world
peace, thus giving U.S. an imprimatur of approval.
374 MORENOFF, supra note 368, at 236.
7.5 Id. at 225.
376 Id. at 233.
177 Id. at 16.
378 Carl Q. Christol, The Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes, Legal & Political
Considerations, 28th Colloquium On the Law of Outer Space 4 (1985).
579 MORENOFF, supra note 368, at 226.
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4. Peacekeeping
There is little doubt that "peacekeeping" operations can
substantially benefit from space technology's ability to ob-
serve, gather, organize and transmit information. 8 Unfor-
tunately, as the U.N. recognizes, the U.N. has a very serious
command and control problem.3 8 1 The U.N. is attempting
to remedy this problem by creating a new command and
control center to keep the U.N. Headquarters in touch with
peacekeeping operations throughout the world. 8 2
"Today, almost 60,000 U.N. peacekeepers participate in
13 peacekeeping missions ranging from Somalia to Cambo-
dia to Bosnia... [and] [m] ore peacekeeping operations have
been initiated in the past five years than in the previous 43
[years] .... Without peacekeeping, "[n] ations will not
have the security needed to develop; without development,
people will fight endlessly .. . and without democracy,
neither long-term economic development nor long-term
peace and stability will be possible."384
Article 42 of the U.N. Charter gives the Security Council
the authority to take enforcement action necessary to
"maintain or restore international peace and security." The
U.N.'s use of military forces provided by member States is
an essential element of world order and has become a well-
established practice supported by all major powers. 385 Be-
cause of the U.N.'s notable elasticity in the exercise of
peacekeeping functions, it is difficult to identify a precise
definition of peacekeeping.38 6 Regardless, the U.N. has rec-
ognized that traditional peacekeeping operations may have
30 TJ.F. Pavlasek, The Relationship of Technology to Peacekeeping in Space, ARMS CON-
TROL & DISARMAMENT IN OUTER SPACE: TowARDs OPEN SKIES, Lecture Seminars given
at the Centre for Research in Air & Space Law, McGill University 132, 134 (1989).
38, Adam Roberts, The United Nations and International Security, 35 SURVIVAL 18
(1993).
382 Id.
31 Madeleine K. Abright, What You Need to Know About the United Nations, Foreign
Policy Today, 59 VITAL SPEECHES 486-88.
3" Id. at 487.
358 Bruce Russett & James S. Sutterlin, The U.N. In A New World Order, 2 FOREIGN
Aer., 69-70 (1991).
S Id.
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to be "complemented by more forceful measures, including
preventive deployments and peace-enforcement." 87
Since the U.N. Security Council is, essentially, the ulti-
mate judge of what constitutes legitimate peacekeeping or
peace-enforcement actions and since the U.N. will not act
for non-peaceful purposes, actions by member States in
support of U.N. resolutions, including tactical military use
of commercial communications satellite capabilities, can
hardly be questioned. The maintenance of international
peace and stability is a fundamental obligation of all
States.388
D. RULES OF TV ET INTERPRETATION
Traditionally, the law of treaty interpretation was based
on customary international law principles.389 In 1980, how-
ever, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties came
into force. Although only approximately fifty-nine coun-
tries are parties to it, the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties390 is accepted by many non-parties, including the
U.S.,3 91 as defining the rules of treaty law.392
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention requires States to
perform treaty obligations in good faith (Pacta Sunt Ser-
vanda). Article 31 sets forth the rules of treaty interpreta-
tion. Treaty terms are to be interpreted in accordance with
their ordinary meaning given the terms in context, and in
light of the treaty's object and purpose. The "context" in-
cludes any other agreement made by the states regarding
the conclusion of the treaty, and any instrument made by a
387 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-making
and Peacekeeping, U.N. A/47/277 (1992).
"s SINGH, supra note 332, at 86-87.
' CARTER & TRiMBLE, supra note 343, at 79.
0 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, entered into force 27 Jan. 1980,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 38/27, reprinted in, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna
Convention].
-91 M. JANis, AN INTRODucriON TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 15 (1988).
392 The Vienna Convention itself specifies that it is only applicable to treaties con-
cluded after its enactment. Article 3 of the Convention specifies that the non-appli-
cability of the Convention to an international agreement shall not affect the legal
force of such an agreement.
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party in connection with the conclusion of the treaty ac-
cepted by the other party; any subsequent agreements re-
garding interpretation of the treaty; any subsequent
practice in its application which establishes the agreement
of the parties regarding its interpretation; and any rule of
international law applicable to the relations between the
parties. Finally, a special meaning shall be given a term if it
is established that the parties so intended.
Article 32 of the Convention permits reference to supple-
mental means of interpretation when, after using Article
31, the treaty's meaning remains ambiguous, obscure, or
leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
The preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances
of its conclusion are permissible supplemental means for
interpretation under Article 32.
A strict interpretation of Article IV's "peaceful purposes"
clause would seem to leave little room for doubting that it
was meant to apply only to the moon and other celestial
bodies not "outer space." Thus, one might be inclined to
agree with the first theory regarding the interpretation of
the clause.
The object and purpose of the Treaty, however, are also
quite clear: the use of outer space is to be for the benefit
and in the interests of all mankind and all countries in ac-
cordance with international law, including the U.N. Char-
ter (U.N. Resolutions). It shall be conducted in a manner
which will maintain international peace, security, and coop-
eration giving due regard to corresponding interests of
other States. International law and the U.N. Charter re-
quire that the use of outer space not involve armed force or
the threat of force, unless it is in the "common interest" or
for legitimate "self-defense." Thus, it appears the ordinary
meaning of each of those clauses, when viewed in context
of the Treaty as a whole and given its object and purpose,
supports the interpretation given the Treaty by those who
advocate the second theory. How can this be resolved?
One utilizes "supplementary" means of interpretation
only when the result of an Article 31 (Vienna Convention)
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analysis leads to absurd or unreasonable results or the
meaning remains obscure or ambiguous. The interpreta-
tion under the second theory hardly leads to absurd or un-
reasonable results; the Outer Space Treaty's concept of
using outer space for "peaceful purposes" was not novel;
nor were any "nonpeaceful" uses being made of outer space
when the Treaty was signed. True, the military was using
space but not in a nonpeaceful way. Likewise, acceptance
of the interpretation of the provisions under theory two
does not leave them ambiguous or obscure. Thus, reference
to "supplementary" means of interpretation, although use-
ful, is unnecessary.
Moreover, the practices of the parties to the Outer Space
Treaty subsequent to its signing and entry into force evi-
dences, if not establishes, their tacit agreement regarding
the treaty's interpretation. Based on publicly available in-
formation, outer space has never been found to have been
used for "nonpeaceful purposes," as that phrase is generally
defined. 93 It may be argued that nations have threatened
to use it in a militarily threatening way, most notably the
U.S. "Strategic Defense Initiative," or "Star Wars." But, such
uses have yet to materialize. The only objections concern-
ing the use of outer space have been from equatorial states
and deal with assignment of geostationary orbital slots. 394
The second theory's interpretation is further supported by
the development of customary international law in this
area.
PART IV. WHAT IS "PEACE?"
"Making peace is harder than making war."395 Adlai
Stevenson
193 This assumes that outer space does not include that area in which ballistic
missiles operate. JASANi, supra note 345, at 17 (noting that dedicated space weapons
have yet to be deployed).
594 Reed & Norris, supra note 4, at 678. Vlasic, supra note 16, at 45 (stating that
"[n] o State has ever formally protested the U.S. interpretation of the phrase 'peace-
ful purposes' in the context of Outer Space activities").
395 Kenneth Schmitz, Hegel On War and Peace, in CONCEPTIONS OF PEACE IN THE
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 134 (1987).
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A. SOCIOLOGICAL DEFINITIONS OF "PEACE"
In the words of the Old Testament, the "prospects of war
and peace are easily discernible: apocalyptic visions as op-
posed to the hope that one day nations 'shall beat their
swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning
hooks: nation shall not lift sword against nation, neither
shall they learn war any more."'39 6 "Peace" was character-
ized by Greek philosophers as "the greatest good."397 While
it "is an integral part of all humanist ideals of society" there
is a wide disparity of views about what it means.398 In the
context of space law, Alan Vasborne called it a "utopian
dream.3 99
At least one definition of "peace" is "freedom from, or
cessation of, war or hostilities. '"400 It is "misconceived when
it is thought of only as ... an absence of the condition of
war . .. it is an irreducibly value-laden concept."40 1 One
author opined that the phenomena of war and peace
change with fluctuations in military techniques.40 2 "Peace is
not a state, but a process," according to Johan Galtung. 40
The term "peaceful" has been defined "in all reputable dic-
tionaries of the English language" essentially as "disposed
or inclined to peace; aiming at or making for peace;
friendly, amicable, pacific. 40 4
396 Hristo Smolenov, War and Alienation, in Conceptions of Peace In the History of
Philosophy 136 (1987).
397 Alfred Bonisch, Elements of the Modern Concept of Peace, 18 J. PEACE RES., 165
(1981).
-18 Id. at 166.
319 Marko G. Markov, Against the So-Called "Broader" Interpretation of the Term "Peace-
ful" In International Space Law, Proceedings of the Eleventh Colloquium On the Law
of Outer Space, Oct. 17, 1968, (1969) at 73.
400 SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1533 (1973).
40, Richard A. Berg, Commentaire, in Conceptions of Peace In the History of Philos-
ophy 45 (1987).
402 Vassil Prodanov, Moral Norms and Political Prerequisites for Peaceful Cohabitation
and Ideological Emulation, in CONCEPTIONS OF PEACE IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
35 (1987).
403 Bonisch, supra note 397, at 167.
Vlasic, supra note 16, at 44 (citing THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENG-
LISH DICIONARY, II 2105 (1971)).
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David Felder suggests that if we define "peace" too
broadly "we end up doing things that are not really related
to peace" and if we define it too narrowly "success at achiev-
ing our goals is not enough to bring peace. "405 He believes
equating peace with "disarmament" is too narrow a defini-
tion and defining it as "ending all conflicts" is too broad.40 6
He suggests that an adequate definition is "the non-violent
settling of conflicts between nations."4 °7 Although peace is
usually thought of as the absence of open fighting or war,
drawing upon Thomas Hobb's observations three centuries
ago, Felder concludes "peace" is really a climate where the
will to resolve conflict through battle is absent.408 Peace is
not merely "disarmament," but rather, "peace" is the cli-
mate in which the will to resolve international disputes
through armed conflict is absent. "Peace" is not a static con-
cept but rather a dynamically changing one.
"Peace," like "war," is merely an extension of politics.409 If
one reflects on the purposes of the U.N. Charter, one can
observe that the entire structure of the U.N. is based upon
an attempt to develop rules and mechanisms that promote
peace and avoid the use of armed force.410 It follows that
any use of outer space which does not violate the Charter's
prohibitions or the specific prohibitions of treaties related
to Outer Space would be permitted.4 '
-5 David Felder, Problems in Defining Peace, Philosophie Et Cultur, Proceedings of
the XVIIth World Congress of Philosophy 686 (1988).
406 Id.
407 Id. at 687.
4- Id.
4- Clausewitz defined "war" as "[m]erely the continuation of policy (politics) by
other means." CARL VON CLAUSEwrrz, ON WAR 87 (Michael Howard and Peter Paret
eds. & trans., 1976).
410 Treaties are "one of the instruments for making, if not preserving the
peace.. .they 'ought' to be kept." Kenneth Schmitz, Hegel On War and Peace, in CON-
CEPTIONS OF PEACE IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 135 (1987).
41 1 NICHOLAS KATZENBACH & LEON LIPSON, REPORT TO THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS
AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 26 (1961).
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B. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Generally, before a usage may be considered as having
attained the status of customary international law, two tests
must be satisfied: (1) there must be a repetition or recur-
rence of the acts giving rise to the rule (the usage element);
and (2) the mutual conviction that the recurrence is the
result of a customary rule (opinio juris).412 The duration of
a usage needed for a rule to become one of customary in-
ternational law varies. The opinio juris element essentially
requires that states adhere to the "rule" because they be-
lieve it is binding.
A rule becomes one of customary international law when
a significant majority of States, including States whose inter-
ests are specifically affected, act extensively and virtually
uniform in accordance with it because they believe it is
binding.4 13 Evidence of customary international law may be
found in diplomatic correspondence, official statements,
military and administrative practices, treaties, and judicial
decisions.414 In the U.S., the President plays the principle
role in articulating U.S. views of customary international
law.415
For example, in the late 1800s, when an American ship
collided with a British ship, the Scotia, the U.S. Supreme
Court found that rules of navigation, established by custom,
usage and mutual consent were considered "obligatory" by
over thirty seafaring states and amounted to customary in-
ternational law. "Like all the law of nations, (the law of the
sea) rests upon the common consent of civilized communi-
ties. It is of force not because it was prescribed by any supe-
rior power, but because it has been generally accepted as a
rule of conduct...
412 CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 343, at 111.
413 Vlasic, supra note 16, at 45. See also IRVIN L. WHITE, DECISION-MAKNG FOR SPACE
10 (1970).
414 CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 343, at 219.
415 Id.
416 The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170 (1871).
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Treaty provisions may simply be a declaration of existing
customary international law or, if there is not such a decla-
ration, treaty provisions may become so with the passage of
time through general acceptance by other states.417 The
consensus is that the Outer Space Treaty, rather than creat-
ing new law, merely amounted to a codification of existing
principles of customary international law applicable to
outer space, which already had been expressed in U.N.
General Assembly resolutions and which had already
gained acceptance internationally.418 Thus, in the opinion
of many scholars, the inclusion in the Outer Space Treaty
of the concept of use of outer space for "peaceful purposes"
was merely a restatement of then existing customary inter-
national law.41
There are also certain norms of international law so fun-
damental that states may not legally agree to contradict
them. These norms are referred too as Jus Cogens.42 0
Under Article 53 of the Vienna Convention, treaties which
conflict with Jus Cogens are void. In order for a norm to
become Jus Cogens, it must be deeply and universally held.
Such norms include proscriptions against slavery and geno-
cide, for example.42' Is the use of outer space for "peaceful
purposes" such a fundamental norm? If it is not, it has
closely approached that status since the norm has been uni-
versally adhered too; it is considered fundamental; it has
not been changed; and it is found in almost every interna-
tional agreement relating to outer space. If it was Jus
Cogens before the entry into force of the Outer Space
Treaty, the Outer Space treaty could not have changed it.
417 Bridge, supra note 331, at 653. (citing ORES HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw 17 (1940)).
4I1 Bridge, supra note 331, at 655, 664. The prevailing view is that, "they may be
taken as statements of what the law is; whether they create law or are merely evi-
dence of customary law." Bridge, supra note 331, at 664.
419 MORENOFF, supra note 368, at 185.
420 CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 343, at 98.
421 Weiss, supra note 370.
1994] COMMERCIAL COMMUNICATION SATELLITES 317
C. CONCLUSIONS ABOUT PEACE & MILITARY USE OF
COMMUNICATION SATELLITES
I disagree with those who believe that in light of today's
technology there is no longer any meaningful relevance to
distinctions between "peaceful" and "nonpeaceful" uses of
space.4 2  Peace benefits all nations.423  There are any
number of military space activities which serve to stabilize
world peace, such as verification of arms control agree-
ments and detection of missile launches.424 Such activities
are considered "peaceful."42
5
The use of satellites for communications, remote sensing
and navigation has generally been regarded as a "peaceful
use" of outer space.426 It is accepted that the military use of
satellites for communications, navigation, photoreconnais-
sance, gathering signals intelligence, ocean surveillance to
locate and track warships detection of nuclear explosions,
ballistic missile early warning, and weather monitoring is in
accord with contemporary international law.427 There is lit-
tle doubt that communications satellites contribute to effec-
tive military forces which can serve as a deterrent to
conflict. Some might view this as the creation of an "offen-
sive" or "nonpeaceful" activity. 428 At least one author has
proposed that "the use of space objects to assist in and aid
military operations" is a "nonpeaceful" use of space,429
which may be too myopic a view.
422 "As technology contributes to blur the distinction between military and civilian
(communications satellites) capabilities (which can be used for military purposes),
the notion of peaceful and nonpeaceful uses of space may appear increasingly irrele-
vant if one continues to rely on criteria traditionally relied upon to differentiate
military and civilian applications." SoutRaEs & BOYER, supra note 360, at 73.
423 Reed & Norris, supra note 4, at 681.
4"4 Id. See also Sourbes & Boyer, supra note 360, at 57.
425 JASANI, supra note 345, at 2.
426 Id. at 1.
427 Vlasic, supra note 16, at 50.
423 JAsANi, supra note 345, at 9.
42 Shetty M. Chandrashekar, Problems of Definitions: A View of an Emerging Space
Power, in PEACEFUL AND NoN-PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE, PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION FOR
THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE 97 (1991).
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It has been suggested that the characteristics of "peaceful
uses," identifiable under treaty obligations, appear to be:
openness of information; "transparency" in use (everyone
can see how it is being used); and "international coopera-
tion" (all countries wishing to participate may) .43o Although
military "uses" may not have met all three of these tests, the
"purpose" of most known military uses of commercial com-
munications satellites has been for "peaceful" ends.
The military uses made of today's communications satel-
lites overwhelmingly contribute to the world "climate of
peace." It is evident that customary international law re-
quired that "outer space" be used for "peaceful purposes"
long before that language was incorporated into the Outer
Space Treaty. Proponents of a strict reading of Article IV of
the Outer Space Treaty, which would limit the "peaceful
purposes" concept solely to the moon and other celestial
bodies, have not given due weight to customary interna-
tional law, accepted rules of treaty interpretation, and the
entire context of the treaty in which those words are found.
Those who urge that there is no distinction between
peaceful "purposes" and peaceful "uses" do the greatest in-
justice to the concept. Communications satellites may be
"used" to support tactical military operations involving the
use of armed force, yet not have a non-peaceful "purpose."
The Gulf conflict is perhaps the best illustration of the dis-
tinction between "use" and "purpose." The coalition forces,
INTELSAT, and INMARSAT need not be embarrassed
about the obvious military uses made of commercial com-
munications satellites there when "use" of commercial satel-
lites was in support of tactical military operations. The
"purpose" of the use, however, was in support of U.N. reso-
lutions to restore a "climate of peace."
Customary international law and the Outer Space Treaty
clearly require that use of all "outer space" must be for
"peaceful purposes." This proscription is applicable to all
commercial communications satellite systems and enforcea-
430 Id. at 95.
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ble by either their "flag" state or, in the case of interna-
tional satellite communications organizations, by their
member state Parties.
PART V. CONCLUSIONS
However appealing, total demilitarization of space does not
appear practical either politically or technically.431
A. COMMENT ON COMMUNICATION SATELLITE PROVIDERS
& USER INTERPRETATIONS
The requirement that all "outer space" be used for
"peaceful purposes" applies, either directly or indirectly, to
all commercial communications satellite service providers
whether they are individual, privately owned companies, in-
ternational, or regional organizations. Thus, the fact that
the INTELSAT Agreements do not specifically say that IN-
TELSAT services may be used only for "peaceful purposes"
is of little consequence. INTELSAT services may only be
used for "peaceful purposes."
Unlike INMARSAT, the INTELSAT Agreement specifi-
cally proscribes the provision of "specialized communica-
tions" for military purposes. At this time, INTELSAT does
not provide such "specialized services" so the matter is not
an issue. INTELSAT may and does provide the military with
"public telecommunications services." There is no indica-
tion that any special meaning was attached to those terms.
A review of the negotiating history of the Agreement does
not show that the military was intended to be excluded
from the definition of the term "public." Should INTEL-
SAT eventually offer such "specialized communications," it
may not provide them for military purposes.
As a further indication of INTELSAT's deference to inter-
national law, it must be noted that the INTELSAT Agree-
ment's Preamble "considers" U.N. General Assembly
Resolution 1721 language that satellite communications be
made available to all nations and on a non-discriminatory
43, Reed & Norris, supra note 4, at 682.
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basis. It also "considers" relevant portions of the Outer
Space Treaty and, in particular, Article I. Article I specifies
that "outer space" be used "for the benefit and in the inter-
est of all countries." This latter language is the language of
"peaceful purposes" under the second theory of interpreta-
tion of Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty.
The U.S. State Department has come the closest to prop-
erly defining what constitutes the use of space for "peaceful
purposes" under the INMARSAT Convention. That is,
"'peaceful purposes' does not exclude military activities so
long as those activities are consistent with the United Na-
tions Charter. 43 2 That definition could apply equally to
the "peaceful purposes" provisions of the Outer Space
Treaty, as well. It is very close to the definition of "aggres-
sion" found in U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3314
(XXIX): "'aggression' is the use of armed force by a State
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political in-
dependence of another State or in any manner inconsistent
with the Charter of the United Nations .... ." The defini-
tion given to Article 3(3) "peaceful purposes" clause by IN-
MARSAT's General Counsel is, understandably, too narrow.
While INMARSAT recognizes that the clause does not pre-
clude military uses of INMARSAT services, it places overly-
restrictive limits on military use when it involves armed
conflict. INMARSAT does not consider satellite usage for
"self-defense" as use for a "peaceful purpose." It would limit
military use during armed conflict to purposes related to
distress, safety, and humanitarian purposes. INMARSAT's
procedures permit its Signatories some flexibility in deter-
mining exactly which uses are for "peaceful purposes." This
flexibility is allowed because a competent governmental au-
thority, not INMARSAT or its Signatories, must certify that
the proposed use is for "peaceful purposes." It does not
appear INMARSAT makes its own assessment concerning
the nature of the usage. INMARSAT Counsel's overly-con-
432 Attachment to the Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations (ATTN:
OP-943C) by the Deputy Assistant Judge Advocate General International Law (Jan.
14, 1991).
1994] COMMERCIAL COMMUNICATION SATELLITES 321
servative position results from concentration on the term
"use," rather than looking to the "purpose" behind the use,
which is the crucial test.
COMSAT's view more closely reflects the true meaning of
the "peaceful purposes" provision than INMARSAT's inter-
pretation. COMSAT recognizes that one cannot make the
"peaceful purposes" determination based upon the type of
cargo carried by the vehicle on which the satellite earth ter-
minal is installed. Likewise, COMSAT recognizes INMAR-
SAT services may be used in actual military actions in
support of U.N. resolutions or humanitarian assistance.
COMSAT, however, unduly restricts its provision of IN-
MARSAT services with its interpretation that requires one
to determine if the vehicle on which a terminal is installed
is "primarily offensive" in nature and whether the vehicle is
involved in actual armed conflict. COMSAT says if both
tests are answered "yes," then INMARSAT use is impermissi-
ble; if answered "no," then INMARSAT use is permissible.
One cannot reasonably nor practically base Convention
compliance on the type of vehicle on which a terminal is
installed, nor does international law require a determina-
tion of whether or not the satellite earth terminal is taken
into actual combat. For example, a terminal mounted on
an M-60 tank painted U.N. white which is being used in a
U.N. peacekeeping operation to suppress aggressor mortar
fire would fail both tests proposed by COMSAT because the
terminal is on an "aggressive-type" vehicle and being used
in actual combat. Yet, use of communications satellites in
support of such peacekeeping is without question for a
"peaceful purpose." Like so many other definitions, the
COMSAT view does not afford the term "purpose" due
weight and unnecessarily focuses on the word "use."
Likewise, the interpretation given Article 3(3) of the IN-
MARSAT Convention by the DoD, which parallels COM-
SAT's, is an overly-restrictive one not required by
international law. DoD suggests that military tactical uses
during combat operations may be prohibited. Military ad-
ministrative and support functions are not proscribed. The
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U.S. Navy's interpretation is accurate in that it would per-
mit INMARSAT usage in support of U.N. resolutions and to
counter aggression for self-defense.
B. APPLICATION OF "PEACEFUL PURPOSES" CRITERIA
Both the U.N. Charter and international law require that
the use of outer space not involve the use of armed force
unless the use of such force is in the "common interest" or
for self-defense. In other words, the use of the satellite
communications must be for a "peaceful purpose." As Gal-
tung said, "Peace is not a state, but a process." "Peace" is a
climate in which the will to resolve international disputes
through armed conflict is absent. If the U.N. or regional
alliances, permitted under the U.N. Charter, determine
that a "climate of peace" can only be attained through
armed deterrence or actual application of armed force,
their purposes would be "peaceful." Therefore, any use of
communication satellites in support of such operations
would be for a "peaceful purpose" and permitted under in-
ternational law, the Outer Space Treaty, and the Conven-
tions of both INMARSAT and INTELSAT.
If any one nation believes that a "climate of peace" can
be attained only by armed deterrence or use of actual
armed force, an assessment of its actions must be made
under the criteria of the U.N. Charter or the charter of any
regional alliance to which it may belong. So, for example,
the U.S. mission in Grenada in the 1980's might be judged
to have had a "peaceful purpose" because it was conducted
under the "peacekeeping" auspices of the Organization of
Eastern Caribbean States.4 3 The British purportedly acted
in self-defense during their Falkland Islands operations.
The multinational coalition's operations in Iraq, pursuant
to U.N. Security Council resolutions, was conducted in the
"common interest."43 4 So, INMARSAT or INTELSAT satel-
lite communications utilization in those operations should
431 CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 343, at 1327.
43 See generally Russett & Sutterlin, supra note 385, at 69-83.
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be considered to have met the "peaceful purposes"
standard.
The proposed definition of "peaceful purposes" does
take into account situations where a country acts solely in its
own national interests with the announced purpose of cre-
ating a "climate of peace." If the "peaceful" purpose was
questionable, perhaps such as when Iraq invaded Kuwait in
order to restore its borders, or when the U.S. mined the
Nicaraguan harbors,43 5 or when the U.S. sent troops into
Panama in 1989 pursuant to its individual treaty obligations
to Panama,43 6 it would not pass the criteria under either the
U.N. Charter or international law. Use of commercial satel-
lite services during such situations would be impermissible.
Unfortunately, it would be unlikely that any commercial
communications satellite organization would discontinue
service to its largest customers based on its use of the system
for "nonpeaceful" purposes. It is also unlikely that any in-
ternational organization would expel a member for misuse
of communication satellites. Although litigation in the In-
ternational Court of Justice is always a possibility, the most
likely remedy for such a violation of international law is the
opprobrium found in global political opinion.
In the end, the resolution of whether or not a military
use of commercial communications satellites is for a "peace-
ful purpose" resides with the U.N., the Parties to the Outer
Space Treaty,4"7 and the Parties to the Communication Sat-
ellite agreements in the case of international organization
service providers. Not one instance exists in which pro-
ceedings were initiated under the formal dispute mecha-
nisms of any of those institutions related to illegal use of
commercial communications satellites.
435 Militaiy and Paramilitaiy Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US),
1986 I.C.J. 14 (merits), 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Preliminary Objections), 1984 I.C.J. 215 (or-
der), and 1984 I.C.J. 170 (Order of 10 May 1984: Interim Measures).
46 CARTER & TiuMBLE, supra note 343, at 1274-79.
4-1 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 12, at art. XIII. The treaty provides that any
practical questions concerning international organization's use of outer space shall
be resolved by the States Parties to the Treaty either with the international organiza-
tion or with State members who are Parties to the Outer Space Treaty.
324 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [60
C. CONCLUSION
Maintenance of international peace and security is a fun-
damental obligation of all States.438 The "new world order,"
the change in the defense policies of the U.S., Russia, and
regional alliances, the exponential increases in the technol-
ogy and mobility available to mankind all make instantane-
ous global communications absolutely essential. Satellite
communications are essential to the functioning of any mil-
itary force today which may be deployed on little notice to
remote areas of the globe lacking a developed communica-
tions infrastructure.
While the U.N. has played an important role in working
toward that end, nations have not been entirely successful
in achieving peace. Thus, there has been an increase in
"peacekeeping" and "peace-enforcing" actions by the U.N.,
other regional alliances, and by the sole remaining "super-
power," the United States.439 The U.N. Charter has no "spa-
tial" limits and permits the suppression of acts of aggression
and the use of force in self defense for the "common good."
"Peace," of course, is the greatest "good."
International law required that "outer space" be used for
"peaceful purposes" long before that concept was embod-
ied in the Outer Space Treaty. The concept was and is an
accepted axiom of customary international law and contin-
ues to be recognized in the majority of space-related inter-
national agreements and U.N. declarations or resolutions
enacted today. Although the U.N. Charter requires states
to maintain peace, the Outer Space Treaty explicitly con-
firmed that requirement was applicable to Outer Space.
States have an obligation, under both the U.N. Charter, the
Outer Space Treaty, and the international satellite organi-
zation agreements to which they are parties to use outer
438 U.N. Charter, supra note 27, at art. 1, 1.
4- U.S. "peacekeeping" efforts should be seen as permissible "self-defense" meas-
ures. The "self-defense" concept must allow for such actions as society's technology
grows increasingly sophisticated. If such efforts lessen the danger to international
peace and security and are not condemned by the U.N., they must be found to be
legitimate.
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space for peaceful purposes and to ensure that commercial
operators, under their jurisdiction, do the same. INTEL-
SAT and INMARSAT and their member States are likewise
obligated, under Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty and
customary international law, to ensure their activities in
outer space are serving "peaceful purposes."
Article 3(3) of the INMARSAT Convention merely reiter-
ated the Organization's already existing obligation under
international law. There is no indication why the "peaceful
purposes" concept in the INMARSAT Convention should
be interpreted any differently than the concept of "peaceful
purposes" found in Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty.
The interpretations given Article 3(3) to date have been un-
necessarily restrictive or based on unmanageable criteria.
The crucial distinction between the term "purpose" which
is used in Article 3(3) and Article TV and the term "use" has
been largely overlooked.
Use of outer space for "peaceful purposes" means that
outer space must be used in a broadly cooperative way for
the benefit of all peoples and mankind following interna-
tional law. Nations must take into account the interests of
other states and use space in a manner which does notjeop-
ardize international peace and security. The threat or use
of armed force may only be used in the common interest
for self-defense or to suppress aggression.
That definition does not rule out the military use of
outer space or military use of commercial communications
satellites. It does not prohibit the use of commercial satel-
lite communications in tactical military operations in which
armed force is used. Whether a military use is for "peaceful
purposes" cannot be determined by the type of vehicle on
which a satellite terminal is mounted, by the vehicle's
cargo, by the nature of the communications traffic, or by
whether the vehicle or personnel using the equipment are
engaged in military operations involving the use of armed
force. Satellite earth stations need not be "turned-off"
merely because the vehicle on which they are mounted are
engaged in an operation involving the use of armed force.
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The U.S. interpretation which equates "peaceful pur-
poses" with "nonaggression" is overly restrictive and merely
creates other definitional problems. This is unless it is in-
terpreted to have the meaning accorded the term "aggres-
sion" in U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3314, which
essentially states that an action is not "aggressive" if taken
consistently with the U.N. Charter. In any case, it is unques-
tionable U.S. policy to use outer space exclusively for
"peaceful purposes." If the U.S. or any other nation
chooses to limit its use of commercial communications
satellites to an extent greater than that required by interna-
tional law, they may certainly do so. It does not appear,
however, that nations are limiting themselves in that way.
Rather, the trend appears to take full advantage of legally
permissible uses.
There may be some truth to Vlasic's comment that the
principal space powers have "tacitly agreed" that all military
activities in outer space are permissible unless specifically
prohibited.440 To date, no uses of communications satel-
lites have been found impermissible in any international
fora. This may be true due not only to technological limita-
tions, but to the fact that states have not yet attempted to
test the outermost limits of the "peaceful purposes"
proscription.
The definition of the "peaceful purposes" principle
found in both the Outer Space Treaty and the INMARSAT
Convention is much more malleable than has been previ-
ously suggested. If commercial communication satellites
are used by the military in a manner which contributes to
creating a "climate of peace," their use will be legally
permissible.441
440 See supra note 347 and accompanying text.
4,' After reviewing this article, INMARSAT's General Counsel has decided to re-
visit its policy with more emphasis on "purpose" rather than "means" involved. IN-
MARSAT Message (April 28, 1994).
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